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University of  Alberta 
To understand the nature and etiology of biases in geographical judgments, the authors asked 
people to estimate latitudes (Experiments 1 and 2) and longitudes (Experiments 3 and 4) of 
cities  throughout  the  Old  and  New  Worlds. They also  examined  how people's biased 
geographical judgments change after they receive accurate information ( "seeds"  ) about actual 
locations. Location profiles constructed from the pre-  and postseeding location estimates 
conveyed detailed information about the representations underlying geography knowledge, 
including  the  subjective positioning  and  subregionalization of regions within continents; 
differential seeding effects revealed between-region dependencies. The findings implicate an 
important role for conceptual knowledge and plausible-reasoning processes in tasks that use 
subjective geographical information. 
Geographical units like cities, provinces, countries, and 
continents are almost always irregular in shape and area; in 
their  orientation  relative  to  the  cardinal  points  of  the 
compass; and in their alignment relative to adjacent geo- 
graphical units. Yet they also fit into a simple hierarchical 
scheme in which towns and cities are nested within prov- 
inces,  provinces  within  countries,  and  countries  within 
continents. It is obvious that people know about the spatial 
aspects  of world  geography  as  well  as  the  hierarchical 
relations  among  geopolitical  entities,  and  it  is  equally 
obvious that their knowledge is imperfect. What is less clear 
is how imperfect geographical knowledge is represented and 
how it is coordinated and weighed when used in making 
judgments. 
The tendency to normalize irregular shapes,  combined 
with the tendency to develop a conceptual understanding of 
the hierarchical relations between geographical units,  im- 
plies  that  geographical  intuitions  can  be  biased.  In  this 
article, we focus on understanding what geographical biases 
imply about how people encode, store, and use geographical 
knowledge in making judgments about locations. We take 
the  position  that  most  geographical  biases  result  from 
plausible-reasoning processes that operate on complex be- 
liefs about global geography and that few biases result from 
distortions of perceptually based representations. We con- 
clude  that  the  "mental  map"  metaphor  is  a  misleading 
analogy for the representation of geographical knowledge 
and that the plausible-reasoning framework can account for 
much of the data in the subjective geography literature. 
We explored the nature of geographical biases by asking 
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people to estimate the absolute latitudes (Experiments 1 and 
2)  or  longitudes  (Experiments  3  and  4)  of cities  within 
different regions. We then determined the extent to which 
the biases  are mutable by  "seeding the knowledge base" 
(Brown &  Siegler,  1993,  1996) with accurate information 
about  specific  cities  at  conceptually  strategic  locations. 
Finally, we show that by combining the absolute estimation 
task with the seeding procedure, we can examine the nature 
of the representation used to generate location estimates and 
pinpoint which aspects of it are responsible for geographical 
biases. 
In addition to informing us about how people represent 
and reason about geography, the use of absolute location 
judgments contributes to the literature on quantitative estima- 
tion in general. Other domains that have been studied in this 
literature include dates  (W.  Friedman,  1993), populations 
(Brown &  Siegler,  1993), and behavioral frequency judg- 
ments (Blair & Burton, 1987; Conrad, Brown, & Cashman, 
1998;  Menon,  1993). Each of these domains has  made a 
unique contribution to understanding how real-world esti- 
mates  are  made.  For example,  date  estimation  has  been 
seminal in providing evidence for the use of reconstructive 
and plausible-reasoning processes in real-world estimation. 
Population estimates have been used to demonstrate how 
availability-  or  familiarity-based intuitions  are  integrated 
with  plansible-reasoning  processes  in  a  knowledge-rich 
domain.  Behavioral  frequency  judgments  have  demon- 
strated the richness of estimation strategies and the depen- 
dence of strategy selection on the task-relevant contents of 
memory. Absolute  location judgments  add  to this  set.  In 
particular, the experiments described below uniquely demon- 
strate  that  quantitative  estimates  can  be  used  to  obtain 
detailed information about underlying representations and 
that the seeding paradigm is capable of revealing the logical 
codependencies among functional units of knowledge. 
In addition to their relevance to the literature on quantita- 
tive estimation, judgments about geography can be used as a 
test bed for a range of issues in real-world decision making. 
They can play this role because decisions about complex 
domains are often made on the basis of limited information 
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from a variety of sources, and geography is an ideal example 
of such a domain. Moreover, these decisions certainly may 
be influenced, and thus biased, by how the domain knowl- 
edge is represented. The general issues addressed here--the 
nature of the representation of geographical knowledge, the 
source of bias in geographical judgments, and how different 
kinds  of information are  coordinated and  weighed--thus 
apply  to  a  variety  of areas,  including  social  cognition, 
consumer behavior, and risk taking. Consequently, although 
we think understanding geographical reasoning is important 
in  its  own  right,  the  processes  underlying  geographical 
decisions may serve as a template for understanding judg- 
ments and decisions made within other complex domains. 
Biases in Geographical Judgments 
Traditionally, two sources of bias have been identified for 
geographical  knowledge:  perceptually  based  biases  and 
conceptually based biases. Perceptually based biases have 
their  genesis  in  the  Gestalt  principles  of  good  figure 
(pragnantz), grouping, symmetry, and so on (Pomerantz & 
Kubovy, 1986; Rock, 1973). The primary cause of geographi- 
cal illusions has often been attributed to the operation of 
these  Gestalt  principles,  either  at  encoding  (Carmichael, 
Hogan, & Walter, 1932; B. Tversky, 1981, 1997; B. Tversky 
&  Schiano,  1989) or in later retrieval processes (Bartlett, 
1932;  Moar  &  Bower,  1983)  or judgment  (B.  Tversky, 
1997). Operation of Gestalt principals at encoding typically 
leads to the development of representations in which spatial 
irregularities between regions or features within regions are 
simplified (Milgram & Jodelet, 1976), aligned (Glicksohn, 
1994; Stevens & Coupe, 1978; B. Tversky, 1981), or made 
symmetric  (Palmer,  1975).  Furthermore, items  that  are  a 
constant distance apart are judged to be closer together when 
they are perceived to belong to the same region than when 
they are perceived to belong to different regions (Coren & 
Girgus, 1980; Hirtle & Mascolo, 1986). 
The Alignment Hypothesis 
B.  Tversky  (1981)  found  evidence  for  two  biases  in 
geographical judgments that we refer to, respectively, as the 
Miami-Lima  illusion and the Chicago--Rome illusion. The 
Miami-Lima illusion reflects North Americans' erroneous 
belief that cities on the east coast of the United States, like 
Miami, are located to the east of cities on the west coast of 
South America, like Lima, Peru (Miami is actually 3 ° west 
of Lima). The Chicago-Rome illusion reflects the tendency 
to believe that some European and northern African cities 
are located far to the south of their actual locations, when in 
fact, Chicago and Rome are at the same latitude (42°), as are 
Philadelphia and Madrid (40°), and so on. 
B. Tversky's (1981, 1997) discussion of the Miami-Lima 
and Chicago-Rome illusions provides an important example 
of a perceptually based interpretation of biased performance 
on a  geographical judgment task.  Specifically, she argued 
that the illusions result from the use of both an alignment 
heuristic and a rotation heuristic at encoding. The alignment 
heuristic produces a "tendency for the.., figures in an array 
to line up relative to one another" (1981, p. 409), and the 
rotation heuristic produces a  tendency for a  figure to be 
aligned within a reference frame (see also Glicksohn, 1994; 
Lloyd, 1989; B. Tversky, 1997). We refer to both of these 
heuristics  as  the alignment hypothesis, because,  although 
their precise mechanisms may differ, the effect and its cause 
are presumed to be the same in both cases: The representa- 
tion is misaligned with respect to its actual location in the 
world because it has been "straightened out" with respect to 
some other reference frame, such as a canonical coordinate 
system, during one or more encoding episodes. 
B. Tversky (1981) proposed that North Americans align 
(and rotate) South America with respect to North America in 
the vertical dimension and that they align North America 
with Europe and South America with Africa in the horizontal 
dimension. Given the actual locations of these continents, 
use of these heuristics should produce a seriously distorted 
representation of the Old and New Worlds. In turn, spatial 
judgments based on this representation should be strongly 
biased, with South American locations displaced to the west 
and European and African locations displaced to the south. 
Empirical  support  for  this  position  was  provided  by  a 
compass-bearing task in which American university students 
were presented with pairs of city names and were required to 
draw  a  line indicating the direction from one city to the 
other. Five pairs  of North American  and European cities 
provided the major evidence for the Chicago--Rome illusion, 
and  three  city  pairs  (as  well  as  a  map-placement  task) 
provided  evidence  for  the  Miami-Lima  illusion.  More 
recently, Glicksohn (1994) used a compass-bearing task to 
provide  evidence  for  use  of  the  rotation  heuristic,  by 
showing that Israeli students tended to misalign cities in the 
northern  part  of Israel  toward  the  west  by  15  °  ,  which 
resulted in the cities' being placed along a north-south axis. 
In  general,  then,  it  seems  fair to  say that the  alignment 
hypothesis presumes that the sources of geographical illu- 
sions are perceptually based representations that have been 
distorted  through  normalization  and  that  are  inspected 
during the process of making a geographical judgment. 
The alignment hypothesis thus incorporates three impor- 
tant assumptions that have never been directly tested. The 
most important of these is that perceptually based normaliza- 
tion mechanisms are responsible for inaccurate beliefs about 
the relative location of the continents. The second assump- 
tion follows from the first: Each continent is assumed to be 
represented in  memory as  a  single  unit;  biased  direction 
judgments  occur  because  people  incorrectly  encode  the 
relative locations of whole continents  (i.e., they are  mis- 
aligned). Third, the absolute displacement of cities relative 
to their actual locations should be a direct function of the 
absolute displacement,  in  distance  and  direction, of their 
superordinate continents (Lloyd, 1989).1 
The alignment hypothesis, in itself, does not presume the use of 
imagery in making geographical judgments, and the most current 
and comprehensive theory of imagery and its use in processing 
(Kosslyn, 1994) does not address the alignment hypothesis per se. 
However, images are assumed to carry no explicit meaning, so they 
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The Plausible-Reasoning Framework 
We propose an  alternative  framework for representing 
geographical knowledge, in which conceptual factors are the 
primary source of geographical biases. This approach has its 
genesis in the notion that not all geographical knowledge is 
spatial in nature (Hirtle & Jonides, 1985; Hirtle & Mascolo, 
1986; McNamara, 1986, 1991; McNamara, Hardy, & Hirtle, 
1989;  McNamara,  Ratcliff,  &  McKoon,  1984;  Montello, 
1989; Steven & Coupe, 1978). Instead, the plausible reason- 
ing approach acknowledges that people have multiple types 
of  task-relevant  knowledge  (e.g.,  Collins  &  Michalski, 
1989), that this knowledge is often represented abstractly 
(e.g.,  in  propositions  or  networks),  and  that  conceptual, 
nonspatial  knowledge  is  often used  when  people reason 
about world geography. Indeed, there is  an abundance of 
evidence  that  nonspatial  factors  influence  memory  for 
spatial location. The evidence has been used to argue that 
even if there is a Euclidean-like representation at the local 
level, there is also (necessarily) a global level which is by its 
very nature categorical and non-Euclidean (Hirtle &  Hei- 
dorn, 1993; Hirtle & Jonides, 1985; Hirtle & Mascolo, 1986; 
Kosslyn, 1994; McNamara et al.,  1989; Stevens & Coupe, 
1978). 
The plausible-reasoning framework is based on the idea 
that decision making in knowledge-rich domains relies on 
plausible inferences based  on partial  knowledge (Brown, 
1990; Brown & Siegler, 1993; Collins & Michalski, 1989). 
On  this  view, people have various  beliefs about a  given 
knowledge domain,  and they may retrieve some or all of 
them to draw  inferences about the target dimension. The 
inferences that are drawn and their plausibility depend on 
the knowledge that is available. Thus, the available knowl- 
edge has different affordanees; it allows some inferences to 
be drawn but not others. Currently, the plausible-reasoning 
framework is considered to be the primary way in which 
people estimate dates of real-world events (W.  Friedman, 
1993).  Here,  we  propose  to  extend  the  framework  to 
reasoning about large-scale geography. We assume that the 
particular  aspects  of  geographical  information  that  are 
accessed during a judgment form the basis for, and veracity 
of, the inferences that can be made for that task.  Further- 
more,  the  particular  information  that  is  activated  may 
change as a function of prior knowledge, new knowledge, 
prior responses, and the task itself, among other things. 
The information available to be used for a task restricts 
the strategy or approach that is taken, and thus, the character 
and  quality  of the  performance  (Brown,  1997).  That  is, 
certain kinds of information afford certain types of opera- 
tions to be conducted and certain types of performance to be 
observed. For example, if the latitude or longitude of a city 
happens to be known, then direct retrieval can be used to 
the same mechanisms  that  are used  to interpret  objects  during 
perception" (Kosslyn, 1994, p. 336). It is presumably through these 
mechanisms that an image representation could become distorted 
relative to its referent. Furthermore, categorical spatial relations, 
such as those between regions, are assumed to be represented as 
propositions (Kosslyn, 1994, p. 194). 
"estimate" its location. In this case, reaction time would be 
relatively  quick  and  accuracy  perfect.  However,  if  the 
geographical coordinates are unavailable, direct retrieval is 
ruled out and some other strategy must be used,  such as 
retrieving information about the region to which the city 
belongs (e.g., Stevens & Coupe,  1978). Similarly, a priori, 
an imagery- or perceptually based strategy could be used to 
make a  numerical location estimate if that information is 
available, if it is credible, and if it can be used to generate a 
numerical estimate. On the other hand, just as with direct 
retrieval,  if  the  image-based  information  is  unavailable, 
sparse, or not credible, or if it cannot be readily transformed 
into a numerical estimate, then some other strategy must be 
used. 
Plausible  reasoning  certainly  can  be  used  to  generate 
location  estimates.  For  example,  a  person  attempting  to 
estimate  the  latitude  of Athens,  Greece might know  that 
Greece has a warm climate and that countries with warm 
climates tend to be close to the equator. This implies that 
Greece, and hence Athens, is relatively close to the equator. 
Moreover, because Greece is in Europe and Europe is north 
of the equator, Athens must also be north of the equator. 
However, because Greece has a warm climate, it cannot be 
too far north. Thus, an estimate of 15  ° north might seem 
reasonable, although it is  incorrect (the actual latitude of 
Athens is 38  ° north). This example illustrates two important 
points: First, it is possible to generate a location judgment 
without reference to a  spatial representation. Second, it is 
possible for valid conceptual knowledge to yield systemati- 
cally biased location estimates. 
Now, consider the situation in which knowledge is more 
sparse,  for example, a  person attempting to locate Khar- 
toum, in the Sudan. This individual might know only that the 
Sudan is in Africa and believe that Africa is in the Southern 
Hemisphere. These facts, combined with a belief that Africa 
is generally hot and that hot regions are near the equator, 
could yield an estimate of, say, 20  ° south latitude (the actual 
latitude  of  Khartoum  is  16  °  north).  A  similar  lack  of 
knowledge and line of reasoning would lead the person to 
make similar estimates for many other African cities. The 
point of this example is that estimates are likely to regress 
toward  some  central  point  when  the  relevant  domain- 
specific knowledge is sparse. Note that this type of reasoning 
can yield prototype effects in the  absence of a  prestored 
prototype (Posner &  Keele,  1968).  In  other words,  it  is 
possible that estimates are biased toward the central value 
for a region and that this tendency is increasingly strong as 
item-specific knowledge decreases. 
The plausible-reasoning perspective is compatible with 
the literature on prototype formation and the structure of 
hierarchical knowledge in both visual and semantic memory 
(Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan,  1991; Marr,  1981; Ull- 
man,  1996)  and  shares  some  important  similarities  to  a 
model recently proposed by Huttenlocher and her colleagues 
(Huttenlocher et al.,  1991;  Huttenlocher, Hedges,  &  Pro- 
haska, 1988). They examined the implications of  their model 
in both a spatial and a nonspatial domain and concluded that 
biases  in  spatial judgments  reveal when and how people 
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based  representations  are  distorted.  This  is  because  the 
biases  are  generated  during  the  process  of  combining 
item-level  and  category-level  information  in  making 
judgments. 
In some earlier work that reached a  similar conclusion, 
Munro and Hirtle (1989) used a connectionist architecture to 
model the spatial priming results obtained by McNamara 
(1986; McNamara et al.,  1984). In the McNamara studies, 
observers were faster to respond to locations preceded by 
locations that were either close in distance or were in the 
same region, and the two effects were additive. In Munro 
and Hirfle's (1989) model of these data, the observed bias 
was attributable to a propositional structure (category nodes) 
interacting with a Euclidean space (grid nodes). Similarly, 
Holyoak and Mah (1982) found that intercity distances are 
overestimated when they are near a reference point (e.g., a 
coast), compared to when they are not. To explain their data, 
Holyoak and Mah invoked a categorical level of information 
in  addition  to  the  Euclidean  level.  In  general,  because 
images are assumed to be uninterpreted, effects of categori- 
cal  or  hierarchical  information  must  be  attributed  to  a 
different type of representation. Thus, evidence for the role 
of categorical information in judgments is typically taken as 
evidence that the representation used for the judgments is 
hierarchical (e.g., Stevens & Coupe, 1978). 
We are here taking a slightly different tack, in that we do 
not propose to provide evidence that the representation of 
geographical knowledge is necessarily hierarchical. Rather, 
we argue that the information used to make geographical 
judgments, guesses, and inferences through plausible reason- 
ing is often nonspatial in nature and that much of the data in 
the literature can be explained by these processes. Although 
we argue that the information underlying the judgments is 
often categorical, inherently nonspatial, and even nongeo- 
graphical, we remain agnostic as to whether this means that 
the representation itself is hierarchical (e.g., it could be a 
feature-based  network,  wherein  category  membership  is 
treated like any other feature). McNamara  (1991)  took a 
similar point of view when he discussed the possibility of 
partial hierarchies, in which regions can overlap as well as 
nest. The important point is that we assume that geographi- 
cal judgments  are, in principle, no different in kind from 
other types of  judgments in knowledge-rich domains, in that 
a  large  variety  of information  from  a  large  number  of 
sources is available to make plausible inferences. 
Absolute Location Judgments 
To examine how people represent and use geographical 
knowledge, we asked them to estimate, to the nearest degree, 
the absolute latitude or longitude of individual cities in the 
Old and New Worlds. They were reminded of the metric in 
each case;  for example,  that  latitudes  begin  at 0 °  at  the 
equator and go to +90  ° at the North Pole and -90 ° at the 
South  Pole.  We  chose  this  task  because  it  has  several 
advantages over other tasks that have been used to investi- 
gate geographical knowledge, including map reproductions 
(Hirtle &  Jonides,  1985;  B. Tversky,  1981), bearing esti- 
mates (Glicksohn, 1994; B. Tversky, 1981), distance judg- 
ments (Holyoak & Mall, 1982; Thomdyke, 1981), compara- 
tive location estimates (Lloyd, 1989; Maki, 1981), and travel 
time  estimates  (Montello,  1989).  First,  absolute  location 
estimates render moot the competence-performance issues 
inherent in asking people to draw. Second, unlike distance 
judgments,  comparative  location  estimates,  beating  esti- 
mates,  and  travel time estimates,  absolute  location judg- 
ments  do  not  require  people  either  to  have  or  to  use 
knowledge about two different places to make a judgment. 
Third, although the absolute location task is novel, it is 
similar in principle to other quantitative estimation tasks that 
have been used in both perceptual and conceptual domains; 
for example, tasks that require people to judge line lengths 
and other physical dimensions (Welford,  1960), dot loca- 
tions (Huttenlocher et al.,  1991), dates (Brown, 1990), and 
populations (Brown & Siegler, 1993). In all of these tasks, 
an observer estimates the value possessed by a single entity 
on some continuous scale. Consequently, like other quantita- 
tive estimation tasks, latitude and longitude estimates should 
reveal biases, context effects, and the like. Moreover, when 
regions  are  sampled  densely,  latitude  and  longitude esti- 
mates are capable of conveying detailed information about 
people's geographical beliefs. This should help determine 
whether people have an accurate or biased understanding of 
the general location of a  region, whether they divide the 
region into subregions, whether knowledge about the loca- 
tion  of cities  within  regions  is  accurate  or is  biased  by 
regional knowledge, and what people do when item knowl- 
edge is sparse. 
Fourth,  making  latitude  and  longitude  estimates  is  an 
inherently numerical task. Consequently, to explain perfor- 
mance on this task, it is necessary to explain how people 
arrive at their numerical estimates. It might be argued that 
having people make quantitative estimates forces them to 
use propositional information. However, a priori, an image- 
based  representation  could  certainly be  used  to  make  a 
numerical estimate. Indeed, Holyoak and Mah  (1982) re- 
quired observers to make numerical distance estimates and 
still concluded that an image-based representation was used. 
Thus,  models that rely heavily on  spatial  representations 
must  then explain how those representations are mapped 
onto  and  integrated  with  a  numerical  scale  to  make  an 
estimate, and how and why such estimates become biased. 
Plausible Reasoning About Geography 
We  assumed  that  absolute  location judgments  may be 
biased to the extent that information about a particular city 
must  be  reconciled with  knowledge  about  the  region  to 
which  the  city  belongs.  We  focused  on  cities  as  the 
geographical units to be estimated because the location of 
cities has no spatial extent at the global level, and in this 
sense,  estimating  the  location  of  a  city  is  similar  to 
estimating (remembering) the location of a dot in a circle 
(e.g.,  Huttenlocher et al.,  1991).  We assumed  that  many 
factors contribute to geographical knowledge and that any or 
all  of them  may  contribute  to  a  geographical judgment. 
Consequently, a range of estimation strategies are possible. 
We assumed that relatively few of these involve reading or GEOGRAPHICAL REASONING  197 
computing locations  directly from mental  maps  or  other 
perceptually based representations. 
Most of the assumptions we made about the geographical 
knowledge  people  bring  to  the  laboratory  are  based  on 
simple logic. First, it is clear that people can have knowledge 
about the  hierarchical organization  of geographical units 
without ever looking at a map: In principal, a city is nested 
within a given geopolitical region. Thus, most North Ameri- 
cans know that Toronto is in Canada, San Francisco is in the 
United States, and Marseille is in France. As these examples 
illustrate,  it  seems  obvious  that  people  also  know  the 
continents to which these countries belong, and that they 
may, in addition, have accurate knowledge about intermedi- 
ate levels of the hierarchy, such  as provinces and  states. 
Moreover,  although  containment  (of cities  within  states; 
countries within continents) is an inherently spatial relation, 
its representation does not have to be. Second, people know 
that regions are mutually exclusive, although there may be 
some  fuzziness  about  specific regions  (e.g.,  whether the 
Middle East belongs to Asia or Africa). Third, geography is a 
numerically sparse  domain for most people; they do not 
generally know the absolute  location of cities or regional 
boundaries. This implies that they cannot make a location 
estimate, or for that matter,  a  comparative location judg- 
ment,  by  direct fact retrieval.  Nevertheless, people have 
beliefs  about  the  relative location  of some  regions  with 
respect  to  global  reference  points,  such  as  oceans,  the 
equator, and the Poles, and with respect to other adjacent 
regions. Fourth, people also have beliefs about the range or 
size  of  some  regions,  and  often,  those  beliefs  may  be 
inferred  from  nonspatial  geographical  knowledge  (e.g., 
people might derive range assumptions from knowledge that 
the continental United States has four time zones). 
Though we expected people to have little, if any, absolute 
geographical knowledge about cities, it seemed reasonable 
to assume that for familiar regions, people would know the 
relative location of some cities with respect to other cities, 
their intermediate superordinates, and/or the boundaries of 
the region. It also seemed reasonable to assume that even 
within a familiar region, the relative location of some cities 
is more precisely known than the relative location of others, 
and  that  between  regions,  there  are  likely  to  be  large 
discrepancies in the accuracy and precision of the subjective 
location  of some  cities  with  respect  to  other  cities  and 
regional boundaries (Holyoak & Mah,  1982; Maki,  1981). 
Again,  though  the  information about relative location is 
spatial in principle, its representational format need not be. 
Given these assumptions, there are two general types of 
situations  we  should  encounter when  we  ask  people  to 
estimate absolute locations: In some cases, we are asking 
about  the  location  of  cities  in  familiar  regions,  where 
information about relative locations is reasonably good (e.g., 
asking North Americans about locations of cities in North 
America, and perhaps Western Europe), and in other cases, 
we are asking  about the location of cities in less familiar 
regions, where information about relative locations is either 
sparse  or  nonexistent.  In  both  cases,  the  objective  and 
subjective adjacencies between regions should influence the 
estimates:  Boundaries  associated  with  one  region  have 
implications for the ranges of the adjacent regions, which 
then have implications for values assigned to items within 
those regions. For instance, if a person believes that Mexico 
is  south of the  United  States,  and estimates  that Miami, 
Florida has  a  latitude of 25  °  north, then necessarily, any 
estimate for a Mexican City will be less than 25  ° north, even 
if the person has no specific locational knowledge about any 
Mexican cities. 
When knowledge about the relative locations of cities 
within a region is good, the absolute estimate task can be 
performed by defining a numerical range (i.e., an upper and 
lower bound) for the region, perhaps using global landmarks 
such  as  the  equator  and  the  oceans,  as  well  as  other 
knowledge, such as the number of time zones in the region 
or its climate. Then, the items within the region must be 
placed where they are believed to belong within the range, 
using the numerical scale implied by the range. The mapping 
step might involve carving up the range, based on subre- 
gions  or  climatic  factors;  dividing  the  range  in  half;  or 
breaking it up based on known or inferred middle levels of 
the  hierarchy,  such  as  states  and provinces.  So  within  a 
known region, we should observe evidence for subregions, 
as well as boundary effects in the estimated locations of the 
cities. 
When  relative knowledge  about  the  location  of cities 
within a region is poor or nonexistent, there is little more 
than the hierarchical knowledge of the city and its continent, 
perhaps  inferred from things  like  phonetic  properties  of 
names (e.g., North Americans may believe that Sierra Leone 
is in South America). Nevertheless, to make estimates in less 
familiar regions,  a  priori,  it is  still  necessary to  select a 
numerical  range,  which  necessarily  implies  a  numerical 
central value.  However, in  this  case,  the range might be 
truncated, and the location of cities around the central value 
should be unrelated to their actual locations and thus highly 
inaccurate. 
The location estimate task thus allows us to examine the 
nature of the biases that people have in their representations 
of geographical regions. In Experiment 1, we used absolute 
latitude estimates of cities in North America, Europe, and 
northern Africa to examine the Chicago-Rome illusion and 
to establish the nature of the representation underlying it. In 
Experiments 2 through 4 we added the seeding task to the 
procedure, to evaluate what people do when presented with 
accurate geographical knowledge that is either consistent or 
inconsistent with their prior beliefs and to provide further 
evidence for the conceptual nature of  the knowledge influenc- 
ing location estimates and geographical biases. In all four 
experiments, we analyzed data from only the Canadian-born 
participants, because geographical knowledge and perspec- 
tive are related to national origin (Saarinen, 1987). 
Experiment 1 
The present experiment was  designed to document the 
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in latitude estimates of cities in the Old and New Worlds. 
Because we collected data on many cities, we also expected 
to be able to determine the generality of the Chicago-Rome 
illusion. For example, if people maintain the incorrect belief 
that North America is aligned with Europe, then estimates of 
the  absolute  latitudes  of most  European  cities  should  be 
biased to the south; if the location of the whole continent is 
biased,  as  a  straightforward  alignment  hypothesis  would 
suggest, then all the estimates for individual cities in Europe 
should be biased by a similar amount. On the other hand, if 
the source of these illusions is conceptual in nature, then we 
should see patterns in the estimates that reveal, for example, 
subregional  biases,  truncation  of  the  range  at  category 
boundaries, prototype effects,  and the like (McNamara & 
Diwadkar,  1997),  Because  a  large number  of patterns are 
possible,  rather  than  providing  a  complete  taxonomy  of 
these  possibilities here,  we  focus  on  those  patterns  that 
emerge  from  the  experiment  and  test hypotheses  derived 
from them in Experiment 2. 
Me~od 
Participants and design.  Data were collected from 60 Univer- 
sity  of Alberta  undergraduates  who  were  fulfilling  a  course 
requirement. Each individual performed a knowledge rating task 
and then the latitude estimate task. For each of the tasks, each of the 
68 cities, along with its country, appeared one at a time, in a random 
order, centered on a computer screen. 
Stimuli.  Thirty-four cities from  North  America (mean  lati- 
tude =  41.3 °)  and  34  from  Europe  and  North  Africa  (mean 
latitude =  45.8 °) were selected as stimuli. We selected cities that 
we thought would be relatively well known and cover as full a 
range  of latitudes as possible. The  names  and  latitudes of the 
stimulus cities are presented in Figure 1. 
Procedure.  To familiarize the participants with the set of cities 
they would be estimating and the computer keyboard, we had them 
rate their knowledge of each city on a scale from 0 (no knowledge) 
to 9 (a great deal of knowledge). Before they began the latitude 
estimate task, participants were told that latitudes run from 0 ° at the 
Equator to  +90  ° at the North Pole and  -90  ° at the South Pole. 
They were required to respond to each city with an estimate of its 
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Figure 1.  Objective location profile of Old and New World cities from Experiment 1. Data are 
ordered according to the actual latitude of the cities (listed on the abscissa), separately for each 
hemisphere, from the most northerly at the left to the most southerly at the right. 
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actual latitude by typing it on the keypad. They indicated whether 
they believed a given city was north or south of the equator by 
typing "N" or "S" with each numerical estimate. 
Results and Discussion 
We  computed  the  average  knowledge  rating  and  the 
average  latitude  estimate,  as  well  as  several  accuracy 
measures, separately for each participant and city. In addi- 
tion, means were taken for each participant for each measure 
over all the cities in each region. The average absolute error 
was computed by taking the absolute value of the difference 
between  the  actual  and  estimated  latitude.  This  measure 
reflects the overall degree to which judgments for a region 
are accurate, with more accurate estimates yielding smaller 
absolute errors.  Similarly, the average signed error is the 
difference in degrees between the estimated latitude of a city 
and  its  actual  latitude,  once  again  averaged across  cities 
within a given region for each participant, but now keeping 
the sign of the estimated difference. The degree to which the 
signed error differs from zero indicates the degree to which 
the estimates are biased, and the sign indicates the direction 
of the bias  (e.g.,  positive values  indicate  that  people are 
biased to place cities to the north of their actual latitude, and 
negative values mean that the estimates are biased to the 
south). 
In addition to absolute and signed errors, we computed the 
Spearman rank-order correlation between  actual  and esti- 
mated  latitudes  for  each  participant  and  region.  These 
correlations indicate whether people had an accurate under- 
standing  of the relative latitudes  of the test cities.  Before 
being  subjected  to  analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA),  the 
rank-order correlations were transformed to z scores; those 
that are reported in the text and tables are back-transformed 
from the means of the analyses. 
The mean knowledge ratings and accuracy measures for 
each region across the 60 participants are shown in Table 1. 
As  these  data  suggest,  participants  felt  they  knew  more 
about cities in the New World than cities in the Old World. 
They were also moderately accurate at locating the cities in 
both regions, although their absolute and signed errors were 
smaller for cities in the New World. There was no difference 
in the rank-order correlations between estimated and actual 
Table 1 
Knowledge Ratings, Estimated Latitudes, and Accuracy 
Measures for Experiment 1: New and OM World Cities 
New World  Old World 
Measure  M  SE  M  SE  t(59) 
Knowledge ratings  3.76  0.20  2.14  0.15  9.67*** 
Latitude (in degrees) 
Actual  41.32  45.82 
Estimated  41.62  1.05  43.27  1.09  ns 
Error (in degrees) 
Absolute  8.47  0.61  11.77  0.53  6.19"** 
Signed  0.30  1.05  -2.56  1.09  2.75** 
Rank-order r  .81  .04  .79  .05  ns 
**p <  .01.  ***p <  .001. 
latitudes, indicating that accuracy of relative latitudes was 
the same for both regions. 
Location profiles.  That  the  average latitude  estimates 
for the New and Old Worlds were virtually identical (41.9 ° 
vs. 43.1 ° , respectively) might be taken as evidence for the 
alignment hypothesis, but a  more detailed  analysis of the 
data  for  individual  cities  indicated  otherwise.  The  mean 
estimated latitudes computed for each of the 68 cities across 
the 60 participants are displayed in Figures 1 and 2. In these 
graphs,  latitude  is  represented  on  the  ordinate,  and  the 
particular cities that were estimated are represented on the 
abscissa. The left panel in each graph shows the data for 
North American cities, and the fight panel shows the data for 
cities from the Old World. 
We refer to these graphs as location profiles, and they are 
the main means by which we examine the representations 
used  to  make the  latitude  estimates.  Figure  1  shows  the 
objective  location  profiles  for the  two  hemispheres:  The 
average estimates across observers for the cities within each 
hemisphere (represented by the black circles) are plotted in 
order  of their  actual  latitudes  (represented  by  the  white 
circles), from the most northern city (on the left) to the most 
southern  (on  the  fight).  It  is  clear  that  participants  had 
reasonably good knowledge of the relative locations of cities 
in both hemispheres, although some estimates are way off. 
A more revealing way to generate location profiles, and to 
demonstrate the locus of the biases in the estimates, is to sort 
the data by subjective latitude, as we have done in Figure 2. 
In these subjective location profiles, the cities within each 
hemisphere are plotted, left to fight, from the subjectively 
most northern to the subjectively most southern. 
In Figure 2, it is easy to see that there was a tendency for 
North America (Canada through northern Mexico) to be laid 
out on the same scale as Europe and North Africa (to Cairo), 
which  is  partial  support  for  the  alignment  hypothesis. 
However, it is also easy to see, from the sharp discontinuities 
in  the  curves,  that  participants  clearly  have  subjective 
geographical categories, subcategories, and regional biases. 
For example, in North America, there was an obvious break 
observed between  Canada  and  the  United  States  and be- 
tween the United States and Mexico. Moreover, within the 
United  States, there were two large subregions:  one com- 
prised  of northern  cities  and  one  comprised  of southern 
cities. Moreover, almost all the Canadian cities were overes- 
timated,  whereas  the  single  Mexican  city  sampled  was 
estimated as being much too far south. 
In  the  Old  World,  there  was  a  sharp  break  between 
north-central  Europe  and  the  Mediterranean  region  and 
another one between southern Europe and northern Africa. 
Furthermore, latitudes of cities in both southern Europe and 
northern Africa were very much underestimated. The Euro- 
pean cities that were particularly underestimated were all 
Mediterranean:  Milan,  Rome, Madrid,  Naples, Barcelona, 
Lisbon, and Athens. Interestingly, neither Marseille nor Nice 
were grouped with the other Mediterranean cities; partici- 
pants instead grouped them with Paris, presumably reflect- 
ing the beliefs that Marseille, Nice, and Pads are in France, 
and France is a country in northern Europe. 200  FRIEDMAN AND BROWN 
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Figure 2.  Subjective  location profile of Old and New World cities from Experiment  1. Data are 
ordered according to the subjective ordering of the cities (listed on the abscissa), separately for each 
hemisphere, from the most northerly at the left to the most southerly at the fight. 
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Conclusions.  The data demonstrate partial support for a 
kind of alignment bias, in that there was a tendency for the 
Old and New Worlds  to be laid out on roughly the  same 
scale.  However,  where  a  particular  city  was  specifically 
located depended on how the continents were subdivided. In 
particular, there  was evidence for psychologically distinct 
subregions in both the Old and New Worlds.  Subregional 
biases can have their basis in a variety of sources, including 
similarities of climate, politics, and beliefs about the loca- 
tion of mid-level superordinates (e.g., states or provinces in 
North America, countries in Europe). 
The  particular  manner  in  which  the  continents  were 
subjectively  divided  into  subregions  provides  a  possible 
explanation  for the  Chicago-Rome illusion:  It is  not that 
Europe  as  a  whole  is  shifted  south  in  some  maplike 
representation,  but  rather  the  participants  have  a  biased 
belief about  the  location  of  cities  in  the  Mediterranean 
region and a more realistic understanding of the locations of 
cities in northern Europe and the northern and central United 
States. In other words, northern and central European cities 
were aligned with Canadian  and northern U.S.  cities, and 
southern European cities were aligned with southern U.S. 
cities. Thus, we would expect to find strong evidence for the 
Chicago-Rome illusion when a city from the northern U.S. 
subregion  is  paired  with  a  Mediterranean  city  and  not 
otherwise.  As  mentioned  earlier,  prior  evidence  for  the 
existence of the Chicago-Rome illusion was based on five 
pairs of cities (B. Tversky, 1981).  It turns out that four of 
these  pairs  involved  comparisons  between  cities  in  the 
northern  subregion of the  United  States  and cities  in  the 
southern subregion of Europe (according to the subjective 
profiles of our participants). Our data suggest that evidence 
for the Chicago--Rome illusion would not have been found if 
pairs had been sampled from coordinate subregions within 
each hemisphere--for example, Chicago-Paris or Atlanta- 
Rome.  2 
2 It was of some concern  that an absolute  estimate  might be 
based on a different representation than a comparative, nonnumefi- GEOGRAPHICAL REASONING  201 
In  general,  then,  the  data  suggest that there  is  not  an 
alignment bias per se, but rather, a bias to underestimate the 
latitudes  of  southern  cities  in  both  Europe  and  North 
America. It is likely that the basis of this particular bias is 
due to similarities of climate. The existence of subregions 
implies further that the representations of both the United 
States and Europe are nonunitary. Subregionalization owing 
to nonspatial factors such as climate, is perfectly compatible 
with  a  plausible-reasoning  approach, but it is  difficult to 
reconcile with  a  view based  on distortions  of a  maplike 
representation. It is not that maplike representations cannot 
be  distorted  (indeed,  they  are  assumed  to  be),  but  the 
distortions must be due to perceptual causes and not to other 
kinds  of knowledge.  Thus,  the  data  from Experiment  1 
disconfirm both the  second and third assumptions  of the 
alignment hypothesis--that the continents are represented as 
a unit and that the absolute displacement of cities should be a 
direct function of the absolute displacement of their superor- 
dinate continents (Lloyd,  1989).  By implication, the data 
also disconfirm the first assumption--that perceptually based 
normalization mechanisms  are  responsible for the  distor- 
tions in the representation. 
The existence of subregions may be used as evidence for 
the kind of categorization effects discussed by Huttenlocher 
and her colleagues (Huttenlocher et al., 1991; Huttenlocher 
et al., 1988). If this suggestion is correct, then by judiciously 
seeding the knowledge base we should be able to shift the 
estimates for some regions and subregions while leaving the 
estimates of other regions and subregions intact. Testing this 
possibility was our main goal in the next experiment. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment  1  indicated that the  European continent is 
divided psychologically into  at  least  two  regions:  north- 
central Europe and the Mediterranean. The main goal of the 
second experiment was to provide converging evidence for 
the psychological validity of  these subregions by demonstrat- 
ing  that  they  can  be  differentially  influenced  by  new 
information. That is, we wanted to demonstrate that regional 
and subregional knowledge play a functional role in geo- 
graphical judgments. To do so, we explored how the spatial 
relation between regions was affected by new information 
about conceptually strategic locations, such as cities located 
at adjacent borders. We focused on the division between 
Mediterranean and north-central Europe because we hypoth- 
esized that the bias  to underestimate Mediterranean cities 
implies  that  these  cities  form a  functional psychological 
subregion. 
cal judgment.  However,  we conducted  an  experiment  using  a 
bearing  estimate  task  like  B.  Tversky's (1981),  and  replicated 
Tversky's data  with  cities  from the  northern  subregion  of the 
United States and the Mediterranean region of Europe, but not with 
cities from either the two subjectively southern regions or the two 
subjectively northern regions. Thus, although there are other ways 
in which the tasks might differ, performance in both tasks is likely 
to be based on the same representation (A. Friedman, Brown, & 
McGaffey, 2000). 
We first had people estimate the latitudes of 22 European 
cities and 22 African cities. We then provided the actual 
latitude of sets of seed cities that were all located at roughly 
the same latitude but were drawn  from different regions. 
Finally, the participants gave us estimates of all the cities a 
second time. Before outlining the predictions for the experi- 
ment, we briefly review the general effect on quantitative 
estimates of giving people seed facts. 
The Logic of Seeding 
Prior research using the seeding procedure has demon- 
strated that exposing people to the actual populations of a 
few countries greatly improved the  accuracy with  which 
they estimated the population of other countries (Brown & 
Siegler,  1993).  Typically, seeding  decreased the  absolute 
error of the population estimates. In addition, under some 
conditions, it also improved the correlation between esti- 
mated and actual population. Brown and Siegler argued that 
seeds  provide  feedback  about  the  accuracy  of people's 
metric beliefs (i.e., their knowledge of the statistical proper- 
ties  of the  target dimension--its  range,  variance,  central 
tendencies, etc.) and that they can also provide the grounds 
for revising these beliefs. 
The location judgment task  differs in  interesting ways 
from the population estimate task. One important contrast is 
that actual populations differ by multiple orders of magni- 
tude, whereas latitudes and longitudes do not. Thus, Experi- 
ments 2--4 enabled us to determine whether seeds improve 
performance even when a priori restrictions limit the magni- 
tude of metric inaccuracies. 
A more important difference between the population and 
location estimation tasks arises from the logical constraints 
that hierarchical knowledge places on the target dimensions. 
Regional knowledge has different implications for the kinds 
of inferences that can be made in different target domains. 
On  the  one  hand,  regional  knowledge  is  not  strongly 
predictive  for  populations:  Both  Asia  and  Europe  have 
countries with large  and small populations.  On the  other 
hand, regional knowledge is highly predictive of locations: 
The hierarchical relations between regions allow people to 
infer location from category membership. For example, if all 
of France  is  believed  to  be  north  of all  of Italy,  then 
necessarily, all French cities are north of all Italian cities. 
Inferences based on category membership are inheritance- 
based inferences. There are at least three ways inheritance- 
based inferences can be influenced by seed facts. First, the 
regional midpoint might be redefined. Second, the  upper 
and/or lower boundary of the region, and thus, the range, 
might be redefined if the seeds are known to be at the border 
of the  region.  Third,  both  of these  factors  might  work 
together to influence inferences (e.g., new boundary informa- 
tion might cause the range to be redefined, which propagates 
to the regional midpoint, or psychological prototype, which 
in turn propagates to the items). 
In  addition to inheritance-based inferences, adjacency- 
based inferences should  play  a  role  in  reasoning  about 
locations. For example, when two regions are considered to 
be adjacent (e.g., Europe and Africa), then changes in beliefs 202  FRIEDMAN AND BROWN 
about the location of one may propagate to beliefs about the 
location  of  the  other.  In  particular,  seeds  that  provide 
information about regional boundaries may affect estimates 
in adjacent regions, because the spatial relations between the 
regions must remain coherent. For example, if people learn 
that a particular city in North Africa is further north than 
their previously held belief about the location of the northern 
boundary of Africa, they may move not only the northern 
boundary of  Africa but also (depending on the magnitude of 
the original error) the southern boundary of Europe. Clearly, 
geographical adjacencies  are unlikely to be  an  important 
factor  in  the  generation  of  population  estimates.  Most 
important for the present case, seeds might influence regions 
independently. In the context of geography, then, evidence 
for inheritance-based and adjacency-based inferences form 
the main evidence that participants  were using plausible- 
reasoning processes to make their judgments. We elaborate 
this possibility below. 
Predictions 
Experiment 2  was  designed  to  investigate  the  role  of 
inheritance-  and  adjacency-based  inferences  on  location 
judgments and to provide further support for the conceptual 
underpinnings  of  geographical  biases.  To  do  this,  after 
participants estimated the latitudes of cities in Europe and 
Africa, one group learned that Lisbon and Athens are located 
at 39  ° and 38  ° north, respectively, and another group learned 
that Tunis and Algiers are both located at 37  ° north. Note 
that all four seed cities have similar latitudes. Consequently, 
both groups were given virtually identical numerical infor- 
mation at the item level. 
By inheritance, the seed cities should convey information 
that affects estimates of the other cities within their own 
regions:  Southern  European  seeds  should  increase  (i.e., 
move northward) the estimates for all the southern European 
cities, and African seeds should increase the estimates for all 
the African cities. Furthermore, learning a set of facts for a 
given region should shift all the cities in that region by a 
similar amount, rather than (for example) shifting only the 
cities close to the border of the region. 
In  the present context, the interesting question is how 
southern European seeds affect African estimates and how 
African seeds  affect southern Europe.  Because  the  items 
given  to  each  group  were  from  different  regions,  and 
because of the initial underestimation of cities in Mediterra- 
nean Europe, the different regional membership of the seeds 
sets the stage for a potentially interesting asymmetry in the 
reasoning processes used for the second estimates. 
In principle, southern European seeds provide a northern 
boundary for Africa and northern African seeds provide a 
southern boundary for Europe. However, providing observ- 
ers with category boundaries for southern Europe or north- 
ern Africa has different logical implications for the spatial 
relation between the regions. To illustrate, for the Tunis and 
Algiers group, the new North African boundary is north of 
the original southern European boundary, and consequently, 
the locations of both regions must be reconciled. For the 
Athens  and  Lisbon  group,  however,  the  new  southern 
European boundary is still north of the original north African 
boundary. If the regions are subjectively connected by the 
relation that "Europe is north of Africa," then the southern 
European seeds allow this adjacency relation to remain true, 
but the North African seeds do not. On this view, African 
seeds  should  affect  estimates  in  both  regions,  whereas 
southern European seeds should affect only the European 
estimates. If we find evidence for this sort of asymmetry, it 
would suggest that seed facts affect location knowledge at 
the regional level and that consistencies or inconsistencies 
between  regional  locations  are  evaluated  before  being 
inherited by the item level. 
Method 
The procedure for the first part of  the experiment was identical to 
that  used  in  Experiment  1.  After the  participants  made  their 
knowledge estimates and their first set of latitude estimates, they 
were shown the seed facts for their particular group (Algiers and 
Tunis for the African seed fact group, and Athens and Lisbon for 
the European group). They were then asked to make a second set of 
estimates, using the same procedure as was used for the first set and 
a different order of cities. 
Thirty volunteers from the University of Alberta participated in 
each of the conditions. Based on the results of Experiment 1, we 
chose 22 European cities. Seventeen of these represented north- 
central Europe (Oslo, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Stockholm, Copen- 
hagen,  Glasgow, Kiev,  London,  Dublin,  Amsterdam,  Prague, 
Berlin, Hamburg, Brussels, Pads,  Vienna, and Marseille), and 5 
represented  the  (putative)  southern  European  region  (Madrid, 
Barcelona, Naples, Milan, and Rome). We tried to choose cities in 
Africa that would be familiar, at least by name, hut this was difficult 
to achieve.  More  important,  we chose both  the  European  and 
African cities to span the range of  actual latitudes in each continent. 
Results and Discussion 
We analyzed the average first and second estimates (and 
their  associated  accuracy  measures)  separately.  We  also 
analyzed both  sets  of estimates  together to  examine  the 
effects of seeding the knowledge base. 
The  mean  knowledge  ratings,  estimated  latitudes,  and 
accuracy data for the European and African cities are shown 
in Table 2, and the European data are broken out separately 
for the northern and southern European cities in Table 3. 
Preliminary analyses indicated that participants in each seed 
group did not  differ from each other in  their knowledge 
ratings of Europe or of Africa. Across seed groups, partici- 
pants  rated  their  knowledge  of  European  cities  higher 
overall than their knowledge of African cities by a factor of 
about five (2.41 vs. 0.50). In addition, participants rated their 
knowledge of northern European cities higher than that of 
southern European cities (2.48 vs. 2.20) and their knowledge 
of southern European cities higher than their knowledge of 
African cities (2.20 vs. 0.50), t(59) =  10.30. 
Initial  estimates.  For the initial latitude estimates, the 
accuracy measures  also  revealed differences between the 
three  regions.  The  signed  errors  revealed  a  tendency  to 
underestimate cities in all three regions, but much more so in 
southern Europe (M =  -27.4  °)  and Africa (M =  -21.5 °) 
than in northern Europe (M =  -8.2°), F(2,  116)  =  37.91, GEOGRAPHICAL REASONING 
Table 2 
Knowledge Ratings, Estimated (JEst) Latitudes, and Accuracy Measures for Experiment 2: 
European and African Cities 
Europe  Africa 
Measure  M  SE  M  SE  t  a 
Knowledge ratings (across seed fact groups)  2.41  0.22  0.50  0.08 
Actual latitude (in degrees)  50.45  2.09 
Est latitude  (in degrees) 
First est (across seed fact groups)  37.91  1.33  -  19.43  1.88 
Second est (European seed facts)  45.67  1.52  -  15.64  3.01 
Second est (African seed facts)  47.44  2.26  -5.88  3.66 
Absolute error (in degrees) 
First est (across seed fact groups)  17.04  1.16  26.46  1.50 
Second est (European seed facts)  10.68  1.23  26.58  2.17 
Second est (African seed facts)  12.45  1.28  23.88  1.92 
Rank-order r 
First est (across seed fact groups)  .74  .04  .51  .05 
Second est (European seed facts)  .73  .07  .50  .07 
Second est (African seed facts)  .77  .06  .58  .07 
11.80"** 
32.35*** 
18.20"** 
15.70"** 
7.08*** 
8.12"** 
6.80*** 
6.79*** 
4.51"** 
3.92*** 
"t(59) for all knowledge ratings and for all first estimates;  t(29) for all second estimates. 
***p <  .001. 
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p  <  .001, MSE =  153.  Similarly, the absolute errors were 
about twice as large for southern Europe (28.4 ° ) and Africa 
(26.5 °)  as  they  were  for  northern  Europe  (13.7°),  F(2, 
116) =  30.86,p <  .001, MSE =  123. Finally, there were too 
few  cities  in  southern  Europe  to  compute  a  rank-order 
correlation, but even when these cities were included within 
the  European  group,  there  was  clearly  a  more  accurate 
understanding about the relative location of cities in Europe 
as a whole than there was of cities in Africa (r =  .74 vs..51, 
respectively; see Table 2). 
Figure 3  shows the subjective location profiles from the 
first set of estimates, averaged across both seed groups. First, 
as in Experiment 1, it is evident that there were clear breaks 
between northern and southern Europe and between south- 
ern Europe  and northern Africa,  and  as  mentioned previ- 
ously, both southern European cities and African cities were 
underestimated by large amounts. Second, the range for the 
African cities  was extremely  truncated.  The African cities 
had an estimated range of about only 40  ° , and only 30  ° if 
Johannesburg  and  Cape Town were  excluded.  The  actual 
range  spans  nearly  70  ° .  The  truncated  range  reflects  the 
sparse  item  knowledge  that  participants  had  for African 
cities, which caused them to rely on a regional prototype to 
make their estimates. Indeed, there was no discriminability 
among the latitude estimates for the majority of the African 
cities. 
Table 3 
Knowledge Ratings, Estimated (Est) Latitudes, and Accuracy Measures for Experiment 2: 
Northern and Southern Europe 
Northern  Southern 
Europe  Europe 
Measure  M  SE  M  SE  t a 
Knowledge ratings (across seed fact groups)  2.48  0.22  2.20  0.22  2.10" 
Actual latitude  (in degrees)  53.00  41.80 
Est latitude  (in degrees) 
First est (across seed fact groups)  44.82  1.24  14.41  2.67  12.60"** 
Second est (European seed facts)  50.08  1.60  30.07  2.71  7.04*** 
Second est (African seed facts)  52.63  2.16  29.78  3.70  7.53*** 
Absolute error (in degrees) 
First est (across seed fact groups)  13.71  0.87  28.36  2.69  6.47*** 
Second est (European seed facts)  10.37  0.97  11.71  2.68  ns 
Second est (African seed facts)  11.39  0.98  16.03  3.18  ns 
Signed error (in degrees) 
First est (across seed fact groups)  -8.18  1.24  -27.39  2.67  7.96*** 
Second est (European seed facts)  -2.92  1.60  -  11.10  2.71  2.97** 
Second est (African seed facts)  -0.37  2.16  -  12.02  3.70  3.84** 
"t(59) for knowledge ratings and for first estimates for all other measures; t(29) for second estimates. 
*p <  .05.  **p <  .01.  ***p <  .001. 204  FRIEDMAN AND BROWN 
Figure 3.  Average first latitude estimates in Experiment 2, averaged across the two seed fact 
groups. Data are ordered from the subjectively most northern to the most southern city. 
Second estimates.  Table 4  shows  the change between 
the average first and second estimates, as well as the change 
in absolute error and rank-order correlations as a function of 
the seed group. It is clear that the average estimates in all 
three regions  moved reliably northward. Yet, in  terms of 
absolute  accuracy,  the  main  improvements  were  in  the 
accuracy of the estimates for southern Europe (for both seed 
groups) and for northern Europe with the European seeds. 
Neither set of seeds improved the absolute accuracy of the 
African estimates. 
Consequently, although it is clear that the African cities 
did move further northward as a result of the African seeds, 
compared to the movement that resulted from the European 
seeds, the fact that the absolute error was the same for both 
seed  groups  suggests  that  participants  had  little  or  no 
knowledge of the absolute locations of the African cities. 
Therefore, a city in Africa was equally likely to be moved 
toward its actual latitude as it was to be moved away from it 
when it moved north. Finally, the rank-order correlations for 
both the European and African estimates remained roughly 
the  same  for the  second estimates  of both  seed  groups, 
indicating that the seeds did not change the accuracy of the 
relative locations within each region. 
Evidence for subregions.  The main goal of this experi- 
ment was to use the seed facts to examine the psychological 
validity of the subregions observed in Experiment 1 and to 
provide  stronger evidence for the  causal  role played by 
category-level knowledge  in  location  estimates.  Figure 4 
shows  the  first  and  second  estimates  of the  group  that 
received Tunis and Algiers as seeds, ordered according to the 
subjective location profiles of their first estimates. Here, the 
African cities were all shifted northward by an average of 
12.6  ° , and that shift "bumped" the southern European cities 
northward by about the same amount (16.1°). The difference 
in magnitude between the two shifts was not reliable. The 
shifting southern European cities then bumped the remain- 
ing European cities northward by a relatively small amount, 
probably because the original amount by which southern 
Europe was  underestimated gave people a  lot of "room" 
before they had to change their estimates  for the rest of 
Europe. 
In contrast, Figure 5  shows the estimates for the group 
that  received Athens  and  Lisbon  as  seeds,  also  ordered 
according  to  the  subjective  location  profiles  of the  first 
estimates.  Similar to  the  group  that received the African 
seeds, people who received the actual latitude of Lisbon and 
Athens shifted southern European cities north by an average 
of about 15.6  °, and the rest of Europe was again shifted by a 
somewhat smaller amount. In contrast to the African seed 
group, however, participants in  the  European seed group 
shifted the African cities only about 4.8  ° . The difference in 
magnitude of the northward shift between southern Europe 
and Africa for the European seed group was reliable, t(29) = 
3.44, p  <  .002. Thus, as predicted, the African seeds affected 
estimates in both Africa and Europe, whereas the European 
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Table 4 
Change in Estimated (Est) Latitude and Accuracy as a Function of Region and Seed 
Facts for Experiment 2 
Measure  First est  SE  Second est  SE  t(29) 
Est latitude (in degrees) 
European seed facts 
Northern Europe  43.44  1.60  50.08  1.60  3.58*** 
Southern Europe  15.10  3.87  30.70  2.71  4.79*** 
Africa  -20.41  3.13  -15.64  3.01  2.26* 
African seed facts 
Northern Europe  46.21  1.88  52.63  2.16  5.72*** 
Southern Europe  13.71  3.73  29.78  3.70  7.36*** 
Africa  -  18.44  2.14  -5.88  3.67  3.86*** 
Absolute error (in degrees) 
European seed facts 
Northern Europe  14.27  1.34  10.37  0.97  3.37* 
Southern Europe  27.42  3.74  11.71  2.68  5.03*** 
Africa  28.74  2.37  26.58  2.17  ns 
African seed facts 
Northern Europe  13.16  1.13  11.39  0.98  ns 
Southern Europe  29.30  3.93  16.03  3.18  5.29*** 
Africa  24.18  1.79  23.88  1.92  ns 
Signed error (in degrees) 
European seed facts 
Northern Europe  -9.56  1.60  -2.92  1.60  3.58*** 
Southern Europe  -26.70  3.87  -11.10  2.71  4.79*** 
Africa  -22.50  3.13  -17.73  3.01  2.26* 
African seed facts 
Northern Europe  -6.80  1.88  -0.37  2.16  5.72*** 
Southern Europe  -28.09  3.73  -  12.02  3.70  7.36*** 
Africa  -20.53  2.14  -7.97  3.66  3.86*** 
Rank-order r 
European seed facts 
Europe  .74  .06  .73  .07  ns 
Africa  .49  .05  .50  .07  ns 
African seed facts 
Europe  .73  .06  .77  .06  ns 
Africa  .52  .08  .58  .07  ns 
*p <  .05.  ***p <  .001. 
The general description of the data just outlined was also 
supported by paired-sample t tests on the difference between 
the means of the first and second latitude estimates for each 
city, separately for the European and African seed groups. 
For the European seed group,  14 of the 22 European cities 
were  shifted  reliably  northward,  including  all  5  of  the 
southern European cities.  Only 4  of the 22 African cities 
were shifted reliably northward as a function of having had 
European seeds. In contrast, for the African seed group,  19 
of the 22 European cities were shifted northward, including 
all 5 southern European cities, and 19 of the 22 African cities 
were also shifted northward. 
Conclusions.  First, both groups underestimated the lati- 
tudes  of all of the cities  in their first estimates, but they 
particularly underestimated the southern European and Afri- 
can cities.  Second,  both European  and African seeds  im- 
proved the accuracy of the estimates for the European cities 
in  general,  but  particularly  so for the  southern  European 
cities. Third, although the African seeds caused the African 
cities to move north, they did not improve the absolute or 
relative accuracy of the second estimates, indicating that the 
subjective latitudes  of these cities were unrelated to their 
actual latitudes. Fourth, the African seeds caused the African 
cities to move northward, but the European seeds did not. All 
four findings  support the conclusion that Europe was not 
represented  as  a  unitary  region  for  our  participants,  but 
Africa was. In addition, because observers could adjust their 
representations of the latitude of European cities indepen- 
dently  of their representations  of the  latitudes  of African 
cities,  it  implies  that  the  representations  of  the  relative 
locations of the regions were only loosely "attached." 
The  obtained  asymmetry in  the  second  estimates  as  a 
function of the category to which numerically similar seeds 
belong is relatively easy to explain as the result of plausible- 
reasoning processes that assimilated,  and then reconciled, 
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Figure 4.  Average first and second latitude estimates made by the African seed group in Experiment 
2.  Data  for both estimates  are  ordered  according to the  subjective location profile of the  first 
estimates. 
previously held beliefs about the adjacencies between the 
continents.  The  European  seeds  preserved  the  relation 
between the continents, and the African seeds did not. 
Both the knowledge ratings and the initial latitude esti- 
mates  of cities  in  the  Old  World  suggest  strongly  that 
Mediterranean cities are represented in a separate category 
from the cities of northern Europe, and the two regions can 
function quasi-independently. This finding gives additional 
plausibility to the idea that the origin of the Chicago-Rome 
illusion was in the serendipitous pairing of cities from the 
Mediterranean  subregion  with  cities  from  the  northern 
subregion of the United States. Additional evidence that the 
basis of the judgments was conceptual was that new item 
knowledge had differential effects on the second estimates, 
depending on the regional membership of the seeds. Alto- 
gether,  the  evidence indicates  that  the  categories we  ob- 
served in the subjective location profiles were psychologi- 
cally meaningful  aspects  of geographical knowledge that 
had functional significance for estimation strategies. 
Experiment 3 
The  data  from  Experiments  1  and  2  suggest  that,  in 
addition to information about relative location, the subre- 
gions in both the Americas and Europe may reflect beliefs 
about the similarities between their climates (e.g., cities in 
the  southern  United  States,  Mediterranean  Europe,  and 
Africa  were  all  underestimated).  From  the  plausible- 
reasoning view, if latitudes are believed to be correlated with 
particular climates but longitudes are not, then climate could 
influence one type of estimate but not the other. In Experi- 
ment 3, we used longitude estimates to examine characteris- 
tics  of the  subjective geography of the Americas  and  to 
explore how the subjective location of the continents might 
shift as a function of seed facts. 
In this experiment, two groups of people made longitude 
estimates of cities in North and South America. One group 
was then told that Lima, Peru is located at 77  ° west, and a 
second group was told that Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is located 
at 43  ° west. These seeds were selected to locate the west and 
east coasts of South America, respectively. We anticipated 
that  North Americans  would  have  a  reasonably  accurate 
knowledge of the relative east-west locations of cities in 
North America and virtually no knowledge of the east-west 
location  of cities  in  South America.  Like Experiment 2, 
therefore, one region is anticipated to have some item-level 
knowledge, and the other to have very little. 
Longitude estimates  entail  a  complication that  latitude 
estimates do not. For latitude estimates, the equator and the 
two poles are the reference points for the locations being 
estimated, and they are not associated with any particular 
city.  For  longitude  estimates,  however,  0 °  is  generally 
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Figure 5.  Average  first  and  second  latitude  estimates  made by the  European  seed group  in 
Experiment 2. Data for both estimates are ordered according to the subjective location profile of the 
first estimates. 
city  and  country  (Greenwich,  England).  Moreover,  the 
central  longitudinal  reference  point  (i.e.,  180  °  )  is  not  so 
conveniently anchored,  because most of it passes through 
the uninhabited Pacific Ocean. 
As Holyoak and Mah  (1982)  discovered,  the  estimated 
distance between two places changes as a  function  of the 
location of a common reference point, with close reference 
points causing larger distance estimates than far reference 
points.  Moreover,  a  reference point tends  to  draw  things 
toward  it,  particularly  a  reference  point  that  is  central 
(Lloyd,  1989)  or is  a  landmark (McNamara &  Diwadkar, 
1997). For longitude estimates of cities in the New World, it 
is  reasonable  to  expect  that  the  anchor  at  Greenwich, 
England should affect estimates for North and South America 
equally because it is in a  different category than either of 
them (e.g., the Old vs. the New World). However, the same 
cannot be said for the effect of the location used to describe 
the dateline at 180  °. 
On the one hand, if one uses an anchor in the middle of the 
Pacific Ocean to describe the midpoint of global longitudes 
(e.g., Fiji), then this situation is similar to that of Greenwich, 
in that Fiji is presumably not in the same category as either 
North or South America. Thus, putting the dateline at Fiji 
places no particular constraints on the longitude of cities in 
either North or South America, and participants are free to 
place the continents wherever they think they belong relative 
to Fiji  and Greenwich.  On the other hand,  if one uses an 
equally  valid dateline  that happens  to  be associated with 
North America (e.g., the Western Aleutians),  then partici- 
pants might interpret this as the western boundary for cities 
in (at least) North America. Thus, the complicating factor in 
longitude  estimates  the  dateline---provided  a  serendipi- 
tous opportunity to make a contrasting set of predictions for 
this experiment. To examine these, half the participants in 
each of the Lima and Rio de Janeiro seed groups were told 
that the dateline at 180  ° longitude runs through the island of 
Fiji, and the other half was told it runs through the Western 
Aleutians. 
Although we have no basis for predicting where observers 
in the Fiji group would place the western boundary of North 
America,  the  different  category  memberships of the  two 
dateline conditions allowed us to anticipate that locating the 
dateline  in the Western Aleutians  should  cause the  initial 
North American estimates to shift west, relative to the Fiji 
dateline. This is because the Western Aleutians  should be 
perceived as belonging to the same category as the rest of the 
cities  in  North  America  and  should  therefore  serve  as  a 
western boundary for the category as a whole. That is, within 
the  plausible-reasoning  framework,  there  is  no  a  priori 
necessity for the Americas to be vertically aligned in the first 
place, and there is also no reason that they need to be aligned 
the  same  way  in  the  different  dateline  conditions.  The 
dateline  is  therefore  sort  of a  seed fact;  as  such,  it  may 
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case  of Fiji,  the  dateline  is  neutral  with  respect  to  both 
regions, whereas  in the case of the Western Aleutians,  the 
dateline is in the same category as only one of the regions. 
Thus,  the nature  of the  alignment between  the  continents 
displayed  in  the  initial  estimates  might  depend  on  the 
strength of the relation between the Americas together with 
the  logical  implications  of the  dateline.  Moreover,  South 
America may be only loosely "connected" to North America. 
If so,  then  just  as  the  southern  European  seeds  had  no 
implications  for the relocation  of Africa, because  the cat- 
egory-level relations remained the same, the location of the 
dateline  within  the  North  American  region  carries  no 
implications  for  the  location  of South America.  In  other 
words,  the  relation  "North  America  is  north  of  South 
America" remains  true regardless  of where the dateline  is 
and regardless of how South America is shifted as a result of 
learning  the  South  American  seeds.  Thus,  just  as  the 
southern European seeds shifted southern Europe indepen- 
dently of Africa, the Western Aleutian dateline  might shift 
North America independently  of South America,  and  the 
South American seeds might shift South America indepen- 
dently of North America. 
According to the  alignment  hypothesis,  the  initial  esti- 
mates  of the  locations  of South  American  cities  should 
reflect the alignment of the Americas: The average longitude 
across  the  cities  in  each  region  should  be  very  similar. 
Moreover, the alignment of the continents should be insensi- 
tive to the location of the dateline. That is, strictly speaking, 
the alignment hypothesis on its own does not predict that the 
location  of the  dateline  should  shift  the  location  of the 
estimates.  Nevertheless,  if the alignment hypothesis holds, 
then to the extent that people want to maintain the relative 
positions  of the Americas,  South America should  "move" 
with  the  North American estimates.  Thus,  the initial  esti- 
mates  for South America should be further west  with  the 
Western Aleutian dateline than with the Fiji dateline. Further- 
more,  if South America is  to remain  aligned  with  North 
America, then both the North and South American second 
estimates should shift by a similar amount as a function of 
the South American seed, and the average second estimates 
in both regions should remain similar in magnitude. 
Method 
Participants and design.  Undergraduate  volunteers (N =  120) 
from the University of Alberta participated  in the experiment as 
part of a course requirement.  There were 30 participants  in each of 
the four groups formed by the factorial combination of dateline 
(Fiji  or the Western  Aleutians)  and seed fact (Lima and Rio de 
Janeiro). 
Procedure.  The method was identical to that of Experiment 2, 
except for the instructions  about longitudes.  Participants  were told 
that longitudes begin at 0 ° in Greenwich, England, and increase to 
the  dateline  at  180  °  west.  The  particular  anchor given for the 
dateline  depended on the group (Fiji  vs. the Western Aleutians). 
Participants  were required to respond to each city with an estimate 
of its actual longitude.  In addition,  a chart depicting the anchors 
appropriate  for each group (i.e.,  Greenwich, England, and either 
Fiji or the Western Aleutians) was displayed throughout both the 
first and second estimate tasks. 
Results and Discussion 
Table  5  shows  the  mean  knowledge  ratings  for  each 
continent,  as well as the average estimated longitudes and 
the  accuracy data.  Figure  6  shows  the  objective  location 
profiles  for the  first  estimates,  separately  for each  of the 
Table 5 
Knowledge Ratings, Estimated (Est) Longitudes,  and Accuracy Measures for Experiment 3: North and South America 
Western Aleutian dateline  Fiji dateline 
N. Amefica  S.Amefica  N.Amenca  S.Amenca 
Measure  M  SE  M  SE  t  a  M  SE  M  SE  t a 
Knowledge ratings (across seed facts)  5.27  0.22  0.79  0.12  5.01  0.22  0.65  0.12 
Actual longitude  97.85  62.77  97.85  62.77 
Longitude estimates (in degrees) 
First est (across seed facts)  120.72  2.75  102.15  4.18  5.22***  93.64  3.62  99.03  3.78  ns 
Second est (Lima seed fact)  106.85  4.42  75.34  2.33  7.21"**  83.61  4.72  77.97  2.84  ns 
Second est (Rio seed fact)  86.04  5.13  58.78  3.13  5.34***  74.01  6.07  59.34  3.85  3.01"* 
Absolute error (in degrees) 
First est (across seed facts)  32.44  1.53  49.24  2.68  6.74***  27.04  1.95  43.36  2.92  5.33*** 
Second est (Lima seed fact)  28.21  2.26  19.07  1.54  3.49**  27.42  2.63  22.39  3.00  ns 
Second est (Rio seed fact)  31.78  2.20  18.60  1.73  4.20***  39.76  2.72  21.32  2.36  5.71"** 
Signed error (in degrees) 
First est (across seed facts)  22.87  2.75  39.38  4.18  4.64***  -4.21  3.62  36.26  3.78 
Second est (Lima seed fact)  9.00  4.42  12.57  2.33  ns  -  14.24  4.72  15.20  2.84 
Second est (Rio seed fact)  -11.81  5.13  -4.00  3.13  ns  -23.84  6.07  -3.42  3.85 
Rank-order r 
First est (across seed facts)  .86  .04  .25  .05  .76  .04  .24  .04  8.71"** 
Second est (Lima seed fact)  .85  .11  .26  .08  .82  .11  .25  .09  7.18"** 
Second est (Rio seed fact)  .87  .09  .35  .07  .78  .11  .37  .06  5.87*** 
23.88***  22.42*** 
12.36"** 
8.87*** 
9.36*** 
11.02"** 
6.84*** 
4.19"** 
at(59) for knowledge ratings and for first estimates for all other measures;  t(29) for second estimates. 
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dateline groups and regions.  In this  and all the remaining 
location profiles, longitude  is represented on the  abscissa, 
and  the  particular  cities  that  were  estimated  are  on  the 
ordinate, from the westernmost city in each region at the top 
of each panel to the easternmost city at the bottom. 
Initial estimates.  Canadian observers have a better un- 
derstanding  of the  relative  longitudes  of cities  in  North 
America than they do of cities in South America: Across the 
two seed groups, the rank-order correlations between actual 
and estimated longitude for the first estimates were .86 for 
North American cities and  .25  for South American cities. 
Furthermore, the participants reported knowing more about 
the  cities  in  North  America  than  about  cities  in  South 
America (5.27 vs. 0.79). 
Several aspects of the data support the interpretation that 
the  estimates  were based on pdrnarily  conceptual knowl- 
edge. First, the data in Figure 6 suggest that people tended to 
round  their  estimates  to  numerical  reference  points.  For 
instance, the average estimates for all the South American 
cities  were  very  close  to  100  °  west,  which  is  a  likely 
numerical  prototype,  as  well as  being  about midway be- 
Figure 6.  Mean first longitude  estimates  for Experiment  3 as a 
function of continent  and dateline. Data are ordered according to 
actual longitudes,  from the most western  city at the top of each 
graph to the most eastern at the bottom. 
tween 0 and 180  °. Second, like Africa, the range of the South 
American estimates was truncated: The actual range of the 
cities  we  sampled  (including  the  seed  cities)  was  45  ° 
longitude;  the difference between the eastern and western- 
most estimate was 29.5 ° , and if Santiago, Chili is excluded, 
the  estimate  of the  range  falls  to  19.3 ° .  For  the  North 
American estimates, in contrast, the actual range of the cities 
we sampled was 60°; the estimated range was 75 ° for the 
group with the Western Aleutian dateline  and 52  °  for the 
group with the Fiji dateline. 
Third,  it  is  obvious from the  location  profiles  that  the 
spatial  relation  between  the  continents  depended  on  the 
dateline people were given for the location of 180  °. Observ- 
ers in the Fiji group subjectively aligned the two continents. 
In contrast, observers in the Western Aleutians group shifted 
their North American estimates to the west (relative to the 
Fiji  group), but their South American estimates still aver- 
aged about 100% so that for this group, South America was 
approximately aligned with cities on the eastern seaboard of 
North America. Thus,  the North American means support 
our prediction that the Western Aleutian dateline would bias 
the North American estimates to the west because it is in the 
same  category  as  the  cities  being  estimated.  The  South 
American means suggest that observers preferred to allow 
South America to  "float" about midway between Europe 
and the dateline, irrespective of where they located the North 
American continent. 
Fourth,  as mentioned above, the North American conti- 
nent was estimated to be wider with the Western Aleutian 
dateline (74.9 °) than with the Fiji dateline (51.9°). This is 
reminiscent of Holyoak and Mah's (1982) finding that items 
close to a reference point are judged to be further apart than 
when the same items are far from a reference point. In this 
case, the Western Aleutians  are  subjectively closer to the 
western boundary  of North America than is  Fiji,  and the 
cities in the west of the North American continent may be 
drawn  toward  the  subjective  boundary  provided  by  the 
Aleutians. 
All four observations were supported by an ANOVA on 
the first estimates, averaged across cities for each observer. 
Dateline (Aleutians or Fiji) and seed (Lima or Rio), which is 
a  dummy variable with respect to the first estimates, were 
between-subject factors, and region (North or South America) 
was  a  within-subjects  factor. All  statistics were computed 
excluding  Lima  and  Rio  (the  seed  cities),  to  facilitate 
comparisons with the second estimate data. 
The main effects of dateline, F(1,116) =  11.45,p <  .001, 
MSE  =  1,194,  and  region,  F(1,  116)  =  6.63, p  <  .025, 
MSE  =  45,627,  were mitigated by their interaction,  F(1, 
116) =  21.89,p <  .001, MSE =  45,627. There was virtually 
no difference in the South American estimates as a function 
of whether the dateline was the Aleutians  (102.1 °) or Fiji 
(99.0°). However, the mean of the North American estimates 
was  120.7 ° for the group that received the Aleutians as the 
dateline and only 93.6  ° for the group that received Fiji as the 
dateline. 
Second estimates.  The seed cities influenced the second 
estimates  differently  as  a  function  of  both  region  and 
dateline (see Figure 7). An ANOVA revealed main effects of 210  FRIEDMAN AND BROWN 
Figure 7.  Mean first and second longitude estimates for Experiment 3, as a function of continent, 
dateline,  and seed city. Data are ordered according to actual longitudes,  from the most western city at 
the top of each graph to the most eastern at the bottom. 
dateline, F(1,116) =  5.17,p <  .025, MSE =  746; seed fact, 
F(1,116)  =  21.64,p <  .001, MSE =  746; and region, F(1, 
116)  =  71.55,  p  <  .001,  MSE  =  328,  and  a  Region  X 
Dateline interaction, F(1,  116)  =  16.92, p  <  .001, MSE  = 
328. The interaction was identical in form to that seen in the 
first  estimates:  Across  seed  groups,  the  dateline  made  no 
difference in where participants estimated South America to 
be located (67  ° and 68  ° for the Western Aleutians and Fiji, 
respectively).  However, the average estimate for the North 
American continent remained further west for the Western 
Aleutian group (96  °) than for the Fiji group (84°). 
From  Figure  7,  it  is  clear  that  observers  given  the 
longitude of Lima simply shifted the entire South American 
continent east to that longitude (77°). Consequently, most of 
the second estimates for the South American cities remained 
biased  to  the  west.  Similarly,  the  group that  received  the 
information that Rio was at 43 °  shifted most of the South 
American  continent  even  further  eastward  than  the  Lima 
group,  so  that  many  of  the  second  estimates  for  these 
observers were now biased eastward relative to their actual 
longitude. 
In  the  ANOVA  that  compared  the  first  and  second 
estimates,  there  were  interactions  between  seed  fact  and 
estimate number, F(1,116)  =  12.57,p <  .O01,MSE =  803; 
region and estimate number, F(1,  116)  =  25.20, p  <  .001, 
MSE  =  207; and a  nearly reliable  Seed Fact  ×  Region  x 
Estimate  Number interaction,  F(I,  116)  =  3.06, p  <  .10, 
MSE =  207 (see Table 6 for means). Essentially, neither the 
first nor the second estimates for South American cities were 
influenced  by the  dateline,  although  the  second estimates 
were influenced by seed facts. In effect, observers treated the 
South  American  seeds  as  prototypes,  in  that  the  South 
American estimates were drawn toward the seeds, irrespec- 
tive of the initial dateline: For the Aleutian groups, the mean 
second estimates for South American cities were 75.3 ° and 
58.8 °  for the people who received the Lima and Rio seed 
facts,  respectively,  and  for  the  Fiji  groups,  the  mean 
estimates were 78 ° and 59.3 ° . GEOGRAPHICAL REASONING 
Table 6 
Change in Estimates (Est) Longitude and Accuracy Measures as a Function of Dateline, Region, 
and Seed Facts for Experiment 3 
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Western Aleutian dateline  Fiji datefine 
Measure  First est  SE  Second est  SE  t  First est  SE  Second est  SE  t  a 
Longitude estimates (in degrees) 
Lima seed fact 
North America  122.73  3.99  106.85  4.42  3.20**  93.08  5.04  83.61  4.72  ns 
South America  100.95  6.19  75.34  2.33  4.70***  94.88  5.51  77.97  2.84  3.13"* 
Rio seed fact 
North America  118.70  3.83  86.04  5.13  5.90***  94.20  5.27  74.01  6.07  2.52* 
South America  103.34  5.72  58.78  3.13  7.44***  103.18  5.15  59.34  3.85  8.17"** 
Absolute error (in degrees) 
Limaseedfact 
NorthAmerica  33.68  2.18  28.21  2.26  2.31"  26.50  2.86  27.42  2.63  ns 
SouthAmerica  49.64  3.63  19.07  1.54  8.37***  41.99  3.93  22.39  3.00  4.67*** 
Rio seed fact 
NorthAmerica  31.20  2.17  31.78  2.20  ns  27.59  2.70  39.76  2.72  3.54*** 
SouthAmerica  48.84  4.00  18.60  1.73  7.29***  44.73  4.37  21.32  2.36  5.87*** 
Signed error (in degrees) 
Lima seed fact 
NorthAmerica  24.88  3.99  9.00  4.42  3.20**  -4.77  5.04  -14.24  4.72  ns 
SouthAmerica  38.18  6.19  12.57  2.33  4.70***  32.11  5.51  15.20  2.84  3.13"* 
Rio seedfact 
NorthAmefica  20.85  3.83  -11.81  5.13  5.90***  -3.65  5.27  -23.84  6.07  2.52* 
SouthAmenca  40.57  5.72  -4.00  3.13  7.44***  40.42  5.15  -3.42  3.85  8.17"** 
Rank-order r 
Lima seedfact 
NorthAmerica  .85  .12  .85  .11  ns  .76  .13  .82  .11  ns 
SouthAmenca  .25  .10  .26  .08  ns  .34  .07  .26  .09  ns 
Rio seed fact 
NorthAmerica  .86  .13  .87  .09  ns  .76  .12  .78  .11  ns 
SouthAmefica  .25  .07  .35  .07  ns  .14  .07  .37  .06  ns 
It(270) for all first estimates; t(90) for second estimates with Lima as the seed fact; t(81) for second estimates with Rio as the seed fact. 
*p <  .05.  **p <  .01.  ***p  <  .001. 
For  North American  cities,  in  contrast,  both  first  and 
second estimates were influenced by the dateline,  and the 
second  estimates  were  further  influenced  by  the  South 
American seeds. That is, the North American estimates for 
the  Fiji  groups  were  less  influenced  by  the  difference 
between the South American seeds than were the estimates 
for the Western Aleutians groups (see Figure 7). The mean 
North American second estimates for the Fiji groups were 
83.6  ° and 74.0  ° for the Lima and Rio seeds, respectively, for 
a difference of 9.6  °. In contrast, the mean North American 
estimates for the Western Aleutians groups were 106.9  ° and 
86.0  °, for a difference of 20.8  °. 
Conclusions.  The kinds of details observed in the esti- 
mates  are  consistent  with  plausible  reasoning.  The  first 
estimates indicated that the location of the dateline affected 
the nature of the  alignment between  the  continents.  This 
implies that whether or not the continents are subjectively 
aligned  a  priori,  the  specific  east-west  relation  between 
them is easy to change. Thus, a bias to align the Americas, if 
it exists, is weak and relatively mutable. 
Seeding  improved the  absolute  accuracy of the  South 
American estimates because the South American continent 
had been  placed initially  so far to the  west  of its  actual 
longitude, and observers had tittle  or no knowledge of its 
actual longitude. The seeds therefore had nothing to compete 
with and could be easily assimilated into whatever knowl- 
edge had been activated about South America. There was 
therefore a big gain in absolute accuracy for the region as a 
whole when the cities were moved eastward, but there was 
certainly no gain in the accuracy for individual cities.  That 
is, the seeds changed information at the category level for 
South America that was inherited at the item level. When 
estimates  are  so  uniformly biased  in  one  direction,  this 
necessarily improves absolute  accuracy at the  item level. 
The  North  American  estimates  were  already  reasonably 
good, in terms of relative locations; the seeds did not change 
the relations among the cities, and therefore, did not improve 
either the absolute error or the rank-order correlations. 
The South American seeds did cause participants to move 
the North American continent eastward. However, the data 
suggest that  participants  preferred  to  keep  the  Americas 
aligned the same way they had been in the initial estimates. 212  FRIEDMAN AND BROWN 
So, when participants learned either of the South American 
seeds, the information was useful in conveying how far off 
their  initial  South  American  estimates  were.  There  are 
several ways they could have responded to this, but the way 
they did preserved the initial relation between the continents 
that was revealed by the first estimates. 
In summary, even if similarity of climate was responsible 
for the subregions observed in the Old and New World in 
Experiments 1 and 2, the data from Experiment 3 necessitate 
the conclusion that not all geographical judgments can be 
based primarily on knowledge about climates. Second, the 
South American estimates  can  be  taken  as  corroborating 
evidence  for use  of prototypes  when  item  knowledge  is 
sparse.  Third,  the  alignment of the Americas was context 
sensitive and thus not absolute in any sense. Finally, the seed 
facts shifted estimates of both North and South America, but 
in such a way as to keep the original relation between the 
Americas intact. 
Experiment 4 
Participants who had been given a western boundary for 
North America preferred to align South America with the 
eastern seaboard of North America, both during their first 
estimates and after receiving the South American seed facts. 
In Experiment 4, we explored this  bias further as well as 
what happens when the seeds come from both regions. We 
asked  people  to  make  longitude  estimates  of  13  North 
American cities and 13 South American cities. Then we gave 
them both a North and a South American seed city and asked 
them to estimate all the cities a second time. The seed cities 
came from the east coast, the west coast, and the approxi- 
mate center of each continent and were factorially combined 
to form nine conditions. Because Experiment 3 showed that 
using  the  Western  Aleutians  as  a  dateline  produced  an 
interesting (and apparently strong) bias in people's estimates 
of the longitude of the western boundary of North America, 
all the participants in Experiment 4 were given the informa- 
tion that the dateline runs through the Western Aleutians. 
We  chose  seeds  from  both  continents  and  from  both 
coastal and central locations to try to determine which of 
several factors might be influencing the estimates, as well as 
how  people  would  combine  information  about  the  two 
continents. Note that North America should act as an anchor, 
or  reference  point,  because  it  is  more  familiar  to  North 
American  participants  than  is  South  America  on  many 
dimensions  besides  location.  Moreover,  North  American 
residents  should take a  North American perspective when 
making their estimates (cf. Holyoak & Mah, 1982). If North 
America does act as a reference point, North American seeds 
should influence South American estimates more than South 
American seeds influence North American estimates  (Mc- 
Namara & Diwadkar,  1997;  Sadalla, Burroughs, & Staplin, 
1980;  A.  Tversky,  1969).  Alternatively,  participants  in 
Experiment 3 had a strong tendency to maintain the spatial 
relation between the Americas that they committed them- 
selves  to  with  their  first  estimates.  Experiment  4  thus 
enabled us to determine whether, and by how much, South 
American seeds would influence North American estimates 
when  people  were  explicitly  given  a  competing  North 
American seed. 
Me&od 
Participants.  Participants were 271  University  of Alberta 
undergraduates enrolled in large psychology classes. Because the 
test  booklets were randomly distributed among students in the 
classes, the number of people per group ranged from 20 to 37. 
Procedure and design.  Participants completed two question- 
naires in a large classroom setting. In the first, 26 cities along with 
their countries were listed in a random order. This set included 13 
South American cities and 13 North American cities, selected so 
that the sample spanned the width of the continents, and included 
cities from each coast as well as some inland cities. Consistent with 
the actual layout of the New World, the North American cities 
(M = 98  °) tended to lie to the west of the South American cities 
(M = 63°). 
No  knowledge  ratings of  the  cities were  collected  in  this 
experiment. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were 
given the  longitude instructions, and this information was dis- 
played on a screen at the front of the room for the duration of the 
experiment. When all participants had turned in the first question- 
naire,  they  were given  the  second. The  second  questionnaire 
included information about the  actual longitudes of one  North 
American city (Halifax, Minneapolis, or Vancouver) and one South 
American city (Rio de Janeiro, Asuncion, or Lima). Because all 
participants  received  one  seed  from  each  region,  each  of the 
combinations of North  and  South American seeds defined one 
experimental group (e.g., one group learned the actual longitudes 
of Halifax and Rio, a second the actual longitudes of Halifax and 
Asuncion). Participants were also told that this new information 
was correct and that it might help them. Nine versions of  the second 
questionnaire were created and distributed. Each version included a 
different pairing of the seed cities from the two continents. 
Results and Discussion 
Initial estimates.  The means of the first estimates  for 
each of the 26 test cities,  as well as the seed cities, were 
computed over all  271  participants  and  are  displayed  in 
Figure 8. The location profile closely replicates those of the 
two Western Aleutians groups of Experiment 3, in that the 
estimates for the South American cities generally lie along 
the east coast of North America, and were rounded to the 
same numerical reference points: Average estimates across 
participants for all South American cities were very close to 
100  °  west.  Rounding  also  defined  the  range  for  North 
American cities, from the most easterly estimate at 75 ° to the 
most westerly at 150  °  . 
Table  7  shows  the  mean  first  longitude  estimates  and 
accuracy  measures  across  cities  and  observers  for  each 
region. An ANOVA on the participant means, with region as 
a within-subjects factor and the North and South American 
seeds  as  dummy  variables,  showed  an  overall  effect  of 
region,  F(1,  262)  =  62.57, p  <  .001,  MSE  =  498.  The 
average estimates for North American cities was 114.5 °, and 
for South American cities it was 99.4  °, for a difference of 
15.1 °  . The initial  South American estimates were again far 
more biased than the North American estimates; the mean 
signed error  was  36  °  versus  15  °  ,  respectively.  The rank- 
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Figure  &  Mean  first  longitude  estimates  (large  circles)  for 
Experiment  4,  as  a  function  of  continent.  Data  are  ordered 
according  to-actual longitudes  (small  circles).  City names  with 
asterisks beside them were the seed cities. 
better  understanding  of  the  relative  locations  of  North 
American cities than of South American cities. 
Second  estimates.  The  new  findings  of  the  present 
experiment are related to the role of the North and South 
American seeds on the second estimates. Figure 9 shows the 
Table 7 
Initial Estimated Longitudes and Accuracy Measures 
Across Groups for Experiment 4 
North  South 
America  America 
Measure  M  SE  M  SE  t(270) 
Longitude (in degrees) 
Actual  97.85  63.15 
Estimated  114.55  1.57  99.38  2.00  7.96*** 
Error (in degrees) 
Absolute  31.27  0.76  46.17  1.32  10.78"** 
Signed  15.35  1.57  35.08  2.00  10.34"** 
Rank-order r  .86  .04  .09  .03  31.29"** 
***p <  .001. 
objective location profiles for all nine groups, and Table 8 
shows  the  mean estimates and accuracy measures for the 
first and second estimates, as a  function of region and the 
North  and  South American seed cities.  Each  of the  three 
panels for North and South America in Figure 9 is organized 
according to  one  of the  three North American  seeds;  the 
three profiles within each panel represent each of the South 
American  seed  groups  that  received  the  particular  North 
American seed indicated at the top of the panel. 
From  the  graph,  it  is  clear  that  the  South  American 
estimates shifted to the east with the longitudes of the three 
South American seeds. The original South American aver- 
age  longitude  of 99.4  °  west  shifted  eastward  to  approxi- 
mately  85 °,  72  °,  and  60  °  for  people  who  learned  the 
longitudes of Lima, Asnncion, and Rio de Janeiro, respec- 
tively.  More  interesting  was  that,  irrespective  of  which 
North American seed they had received, when people altered 
their estimates of the location of South America, they went 
on to alter the location of North America in a manner that 
maintained  their  initial  belief  that  South  America  was 
aligned with the eastern seaboard of North America. 
We documented these observations with an ANOVA on 
the  second  estimates  that  included  North  American  and 
South American seeds as between-subject factors and region 
(North or South America) as the within-subjects factor. The 
main effect of region showed that, in general, North America 
had  been  shifted  to  99.4 °  ,  whereas  South  America  had 
shifted further east, to 73.3 °, F(1,262)  =  319.00, p  <  .001, 
MSE  =  283.  There  were  also  main  effects of the  North 
American seed and the South American seed, F(2, 262)  = 
12.28 and 20.61, respectively, p  <  .001, MSE =  407, each 
of  which  was  mitigated  by  its  interaction  with  region, 
F(2,  262)  =  5.87, p  <  .001,  MSE  =  283,  for the  North 
American Seed ×  Region interaction and F(2, 262) =  9.62, 
p  <  .001,  MSE  =  283,  for the  South American Seed  × 
Region interaction. 
The effect of seeds on the South American estimates was 
straightforward and provides a replication of the effects we 
observed in  Experiment  3.  Specifically, the  mean  second 
estimate for the South American cities was directly related to 
the actual longitude of the South American seeds. Moreover, 
a separate ANOVA on the South American second estimates 
with  the  North  and  South  American  seeds  as  between- 
subject  factors  showed  there  was  no  statistically reliable 
effect of the North American seeds on the South American 
estimates. Only the main effect of the South American seed 
was reliable, F(2, 262) =  25.21,p <  .001, MSE =  410. 
The effect of seeds on the North American estimates was 
less  straightforward  when  the  means  for  the  region  are 
examined, but it is quite clear when one looks at the location 
profiles  in  Figure  9.  For  the  North American  cities,  the 
estimates did not increase monotonically with the longitude 
of the North American seed. Indeed, the estimates for the 
Minneapolis  groups  (M =  108 °)  were  further  west,  on 
average, than the estimates for either the Vancouver groups 
(M =  92  °) or the Halifax groups (M =  96°). We think this 
pattern of results reflects the fact that learning the location of 
a  central  North  American  city  did  not  provide  explicit 
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Figure 9.  Mean second longitude estimates for the nine seed fact groups in Experiment 4 as a 
function of continent and the North and South American seed facts. The three vertical panels each 
represent the data from the three South American seed groups who received the particular seed city 
listed at the top of the panel (Vancouver, Minneapolis, and Halifax). Cities on the ordinate that have 
an asterisk were the seed cities; the data are included in the graph but were not included in any 
analyses. Error bars were omitted in the interest of clarity. The mean standard errors, computed 
across the observers contributing to each data point and then averaged across the 36 points in each 
region were (from left to right) 5.4, 4.6, and 3.6 for the North American estimates, and 5.6, 5.1, and 
4.4 for the South American estimates. 
strongly influenced by the Western Aleutian  dateline  and 
kept their second estimates of North American cities biased 
to the west. On the other hand, the Vancouver and Halifax 
seeds provided boundaries for the west and east coasts of 
North America, respectively. 
Moreover,  although  the  North American seeds  had  no 
effect on the second estimates of South American cities, an 
ANOVA on the North American estimates showed that the 
South American seeds did (marginally) affect the magnitude 
of the North American estimates, F(2, 262) =  2.81, p <. 10, 
MSE  =  281,  such  that  the  North  American  estimates 
increased monotonically with the magnitude of the  South 
American seeds.  Specifically, the second estimates for the 
North American cities tended to be farthest west when the 
Lima was presented as a  seed (M =  102.4°),  next farthest 
when Asuncion was presented (98.2°), and smallest with Rio 
as the seed (96.5°). 
An ANOVA that included the North American and South 
American seeds as between-subject factors and region and 
estimate number as within-subject factors examined how the 
seeds differentially affected the degree to which the second 
estimates  shifted  from  the  first  estimates.  The  findings 
unique  to this  analysis  were  therefore the  main effect of 
estimate number, F(1, 262)  =  207.94, p  <  .001,  MSE  = 
552, and its interactions, which include its interaction with 
region, F(1,262) =  36.27,p <  .001, MSE  =  212, and with 
the South American seed, F(2, 262) =  5.96,p <  .01, MSE  = 
552. The Estimate Number  X  Region  ×  South American 
Seed interaction approached reliability,  F(2, 262)  =  2.72, 
p  <  .10, MSE  =  212. Figure 10 shows the location profiles 
for  the  mean  first  and  second  estimates  for  each  city, 
collapsed over the three North American seed groups, as a 
function of the three different South American seeds. The 
figure shows that both regions moved farther to the east as a 
function of the  South American seed,  but in  general,  the 
South American estimates moved farther than did the North 
American estimates. 
Conclusions.  Figure 10 demonstrates how the postseed- 
ing estimates  for the South American cities were roughly 
aligned  with  the  postseeding  estimates  for  the  cities  in 
eastern North America. Apparently, observers altered their 
beliefs  about  the  location  of  South  America  and  as  a GEOGRAPI-I]CAL  REASONING  215 
Table 8 
Change in Estimated (Est) Longitudes and Accuracy Measures for Experiment 4  as a  Function 
of the North and South American Seed Cities 
NorthAmenca 
Paired cities  First est  SE  Second est  SE  t  First est 
SouthAmenca 
SE  Second est  SE  t a 
Estimated longitudes 
Lima-Vancouver  111.78  4.14  98.01  2.03  3.11 *  101.02  5.73 
Lima-Minneapolis  118.77  4.60  112.45  3.00  1.83  104.07  5.53 
Lima-Halifax  113.37  4.34  96.66  4.11  3.84***  100.32  7.12 
Asuncion-Vancouver  110.69  5.09  91.87  2.06  4.02***  101.49  5.50 
Asuncion-Minneapolis  118.05  4.39  107.83  2.72  2.40*  101.57  5.56 
Asuncion-Halifax  106.46  6.17  94.81  4.12  2.78*  93.16  6.78 
Rio-Vancouver  115.30  3.89  87.08  1.77  7.15"**  100.99  5.66 
Rio-Minneapolis  119.04  3.79  103.73  2.68  4.56***  96.63  5.66 
Rio-Halifax  116.73  6.03  98.73  4.12  2.40*  92.66  6.28 
81.24  2.60  3.82*** 
88.18  4.28  3.40* 
84.30  4.84  2.65* 
70.16  2.65  5.65*** 
74.66  3.23  5.02*** 
68.83  4.34  3.82*** 
62.66  3.02  7.31"** 
63.31  3.20  6.29*** 
62.28  4.25  4.35*** 
Absolute error 
Lima-Vancouver  25.64  2.50  13.06  1.64  5.18"**  46.73  4.00 
Lima-Minneapolis  32.64  2.29  22.22  2.07  4.52***  50.36  3.49 
Lima-Halifax  30.68  2.10  25.45  1.55  2.04*  51.23  4.33 
Asuneion-Vancouver  31.94  1.83  15.44  1.48  7.58***  45.95  3.81 
Asnneion-Minneapolis  33.89  1.77  22.63  1.76  5.10"**  47.64  3.63 
Astmcion--Halifax  36.77  2.66  24.22  2.39  4.77***  44.19  4.09 
Rio-Vancouver  27.98  1.65  18.40  1.38  4.81"**  43.93  4.29 
Rio-Minneapolis  30.60  2.12  20.06  1.72  4.47***  43.45  3.85 
Rio-Halifax  29.55  3.84  19.74  1.56  2.61"  39.15  4.16 
23.20  1.97  6.25*** 
31.40  3.23  4.73*** 
28.58  3.72  5.04*** 
18.71  1.73  7.26*** 
22.12  2.46  6.74*** 
24.39  2.73  3.93*** 
18.41  1.42  6.23*** 
19.97  1.84  5.55*** 
21.20  2.18  3.91"** 
Rank-order r 
Lima-Vancouver  .87  .11  .83  .12  ns  .02  .08 
Lima-Minneapolis  .81  .12  .82  .11  ns  .09  .09 
Lima-Halifax  .81  .10  .77  .11  ns  .37  .08 
Asuncion-Vancouver  .80  .12  .83  .12  ns  .10  .10 
Asuncion-Minneapolis  .79  .12  .71  .09  ns  -.05  .05 
Asuncion-Halifax  .75  .14  .77  .13  ns  .02  .09 
Rio-Vancouver  .84  .13  .85  .12  ns  .02  .08 
Rio-Minneapolis  .87  .09  .87  .09  ns  .09  .08 
Rio-Halifax  .83  .11  .83  .11  ns  .04  .10 
.10  .08  ns 
.16  .08  ns 
.19  .08  ns 
.17  .09  ns 
.06  .07  ns 
.03  .08  ns 
.30  .09  2.37* 
.37  .06  3.65*** 
.16  .12  ns 
"t(27), Lima-Vancouver; t(30), Lima-Minneapolis; t(31), Lima-Halifax; t(30), Asuncion-Vancouver; 
Astmcion-Halifax; t(27), Rio-Vancouver; t(33), Rio-Minneapolis; t(19), Rio-Halifax. 
*p <  .05.  ***p  <  .001. 
t(36), Asuncion-Minneapolis; t(29), 
consequence,  altered  the  location of the  North American 
eastern seaboard. This allowed them to maintain their belief 
that South America is  due  south of the eastern  seaboard, 
without disregarding the feedback conveyed by the seeds, 
and accounts for the main effect of the South American seeds 
on  the  North  American  estimates.  The  South  American 
postseeding estimates increased with the magnitude of the 
South  American  seed.  The  North  American  postseeding 
estimates were affected by the North American seeds but did 
not increase with their values. However, these estimates did 
increase with the magnitude of the South American seeds. 
In summary, both Experiments 3 and 4 illustrate that the 
Miami-Lima illusion is not linked to a specific methodology 
or  set  of  stimulus  cities.  Moreover,  the  nature  of  the 
alignment between the Americas was context sensitive,  so 
that with the Western Aleutians as a dateline, the Americas 
were not aligned vertically by participants in either experi- 
ment.  Both studies  indicate that once the  observers  were 
committed to a particular adjacency belief, that belief was 
fmnly held, insofar as they did not revise it in a way that 
changed the relation between the continents. Furthermore, in 
the  present  case,  the  South  American  seeds  were  more 
influential in changing the longitude estimates of cities in 
both continentswperhaps because the initial  estimates  for 
South  America  were  more  biased  than  were  the  initial 
estimates for North America, and hence, the South American 
seeds were more informative overall. 
General Discussion 
In  four  experiments,  we  examined  how  people  made 
estimates about the absolute latitude or longitude of cities in 
the Old and New Worlds. We used a seeding task to explore 
the  nature  of the  representation  on  which the judgments 
were based and the assimilation of new information into that 
representation. Experirnent 1 demonstrated that the Old and 
the New Worlds were divided into subjective subregions: 
There were at least four regions in North America (Canada, 216  FRIEDMAN AND BROWN 
Figure 10.  Mean first and second longitude estimates, averaged across the three North American 
seed groups for each of the three South American seeds in Experiment 4 (e.g., the left panel contains 
the average estimates  from the  three  Lima seed  groups  who received  North American seeds  of 
Vancouver,  Minneapolis,  and  Halifax).  Error  bars  were  computed  across  the  three  groups 
contributing  to each data point, and then averaged  across the cities for each estimate  and region. 
Cities on the ordinate that have an asterisk were the seed cities. 
the northern United States, the southern United States, and 
Mexico) and at least two in Europe (north-central Europe 
and Mediterranean Europe). It is likely that these conceptu- 
ally  distinct  subregions  are  responsible  for the  Chicago- 
Rome  illusion.  Experiment  2  replicated  the  finding  for 
Europe and demonstrated that adjacency relations between 
regions have functional significance for geographical judg- 
ments: When accurate item information came from southern 
Europe, it affected only the subsequent European estimates, 
but when virtually identical item information came from a 
different category--Africa  that had direct adjacency impli- 
cations, it affected subsequent estimates for both continents. 
Thus, the seeding procedure allowed us to demonstrate that 
the representation of the European continent contains cat- 
egory knowledge: The effect of similar item-level seeds was 
asymmetric because the seeds came from different regions. 
Experiments 3  and 4  demonstrated that the basis for the 
Miami-Lima illusion  is  the  belief that  all  or most South 
American cities are located at 100  ° longitude and are aligned 
with North America, either at its center or only at the eastern 
seaboard, depending on the dateline. Furthermore, the width 
of the North American continent changed as a function of the 
dateline. This pattern of responses is likely to be based on 
the  use of a  numerical prototype to estimate the cities  in 
South America and the use of the dateline in the Western 
Aleutians to "pin" the North American continent farther to 
the  west  than  it  should  be.  Furthermore,  the  seeding 
procedure allowed us to demonstrate, in Experiment 3, that 
participants shifted their estimates of cities in North America 
when they were provided with only a single South American 
seed, and in Experiment 4, that the South American seeds 
influenced estimates in both continents, whereas the North 
American  seeds  influenced  only  the  North  American 
estimates. 
The  lack  of  knowledge  about  both  Africa  and  South 
America entails that the location estimates of cities in those 
continents  were  not  likely  to  have  been  based  on  item 
knowledge, but instead, were based on regional prototypes 
or some other sort of general knowledge about the regions. 
That estimates for these regions were based on prototypes 
was corroborated by the truncated range in both regions and 
by the similar amounts that the cities within each continent 
were shifted. 
Note  that  a  regional  prototype  is  the  psychological 
midpoint of a region. In contrast,  seed facts are numerical 
values. Seed facts can act like anchors, and anchors typically GEOGRAPHICAL REASONING  217 
draw things toward them. In geography, however, it appears 
that seeds, as anchors, can affect  judgments in several ways. 
Occasionally, an anchor is a functional prototype, as when 
items are drawn toward it and eventually cluster around it. 
This kind of anchoring appeared to occur with some of the 
South American seeds in Experiments 3 and 4. More often, 
an  anchor acts  like a  boundary,  so that items  are  drawn 
toward it but not beyond it. This kind of anchoring was seen 
when the African cities were drawn toward, but not beyond, 
the north African seeds in Experiment 2. However, because 
of the spatial relations inherent between regions, when seeds 
assume the role of regional boundaries they can  "push" 
cities  away  from them  (e.g.,  the  movement  of southern 
Europe with the north African seeds). Furthermore, seeds 
that  provide regional boundaries  may  affect estimates  in 
both locally adjacent and globally coordinate regions, be- 
cause the spatial relations between the regions must remain 
coherent (A.  Friedman &  Brown, in press).  The circum- 
stances under which seeds assume each of these roles are not 
clear  and  should  provide  a  topic  for  future  research. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that when the seeding procedure is 
combined with the subjective location profiles, it provides 
compelling evidence for the existence of psychologically 
distinct geographical categories and subeategories, as well 
as  evidence  for  the  existence  and  use  of  geographical 
prototypes. The prototype, boundary, and anchoring effects 
we observed are further support for the conceptual underpin- 
nings that are the basis of the judgments. 
The variety of evidence we obtained for both inheritance- 
and adjacency-based inferences in the second estimates of 
Experiments  2-4  supports  the  use  of plausible-reasoning 
strategies in the location estimate task. We think it is quite 
likely that  plausible-reasoning  processes  and  conceptual- 
level knowledge of the sort described throughout this article 
are  also used in other tasks  requiring geographical judg- 
ments,  including  distance  estimates  (Holyoak  &  Mah, 
1982), comparative location estimates (Maki, 1981; Stevens 
& Coupe, 1978), and bearing estimates (Glicksohn, 1994; B. 
Tversky, 1981). Note that we are not claiming that mental 
maps do not exist, nor do we think that perceptually based 
representations  of  large-scale  geography  always  play  a 
secondary role to more conceptually based representations. 
However, in the plansible-reasoning view, many phenomena 
that appear to be perceptually based have alternative expla- 
nations. For example, in the Glicksohn (1994) study, if the 
knowledge that north is at 90  ° is combined with the belief 
that  cities  in  northern  Israel  are  due  north  of cities  in 
southern Israel, then one readily predicts exactly the  15  ° 
(point estimate) discrepancy between actual and estimated 
locations  that  he  obtained,  without  reference  to  analog 
representations or image processes. Moreover, although the 
belief that cities in northern Israel are due north of cities in 
southern Israel could have been caused by the normalization 
of map-derived memories, it seems equally plausible that 
such beliefs could stem  from a  variety of other sources. 
These include, for example, having been told that certain 
cities  are  north  of others  or driving  from one region to 
another (few highway exit signs indicate anything other than 
the cardinal directions). 
Thus, although we do not deny that maps are an important 
source of geographical knowledge, the apparent simplifica- 
tion of geographical knowledge may have many sources. 
Consequently,  another direction for future research  is  to 
delineate  the  circumstances  under which  either plausible 
reasoning with different kinds of knowledge or the use of 
perceptual or imaginal processes play a role in all kinds of 
judgments about geography. The delineation of these differ- 
ent circumstances probably is not as simple as categorizing 
the  different stimulus  domains  in  which  observers  make 
memorial and perceptual spatial judgments (e.g., maps vs. 
stories or maps vs. graphs; B. Tversky, 1997; B. Tversky & 
Schiano, 1989). It may be that a more important distinction 
is  between  geographical  knowledge  gained  from  direct 
navigational  experience (e.g.,  Thorndyke &  Hayes-Roth, 
1982) versus knowledge acquired from maps. Yet even that 
distinction seems simplistic, when one considers the ways in 
which these two kinds of knowledge may be queried and 
used  in  different  circumstances  (e.g.,  giving  directions; 
making  time  or  distance  estimates;  recalling  landmarks; 
figuring out a detour). 
Recently, Huttenlocher (Huttenlocher et al., 1988; 1991), 
Kosslyn (1995), McNamara and Diwadkar (1997), and B. 
Tversky (1997)  have each concluded, albeit for different 
reasons  and  regarding  different sets  of data,  that  spatial 
judgments in a variety of tasks draw on multiple sources of 
knowledge. We agree. Furthermore, McNamara and Didwad- 
kar concluded, from the asymmetries they found in spatial 
judgments, that stimuli retrieved from long-term memory 
are  interpreted  and  scaled  by  the  context  in  which  the 
retrieval takes place. This idea is not far from the idea we 
have put forward regarding the multiple types of information 
that are activated and then used in judgments in general. Part 
of that information is surely given by context (e.g., seeds). 
We merely add that the plansible-reasoning framework is 
useful  here because  the  fundamental  assumption  of this 
framework is  that people use whatever information is  at 
hand to aid their judgment and decision-making processes 
and that what is  "at hand" may change with a  variety of 
factors. 
The contributions of this research are thus twofold. First, 
we have explained a diverse set of findings in our own data 
and  provided  a  framework for re-evaluating  and  further 
understanding a diverse set of findings from other geographi- 
cal judgment tasks. Second, the plausible-reasoning frame- 
work we  outline provides a  model of how decisions  are 
reached in other complex domains. What all such domains 
have in common is that the sources of knowledge are varied, 
the knowledge itself is usually limited, and its representation 
plays an important role in how it is retrieved, evaluated, and 
used in making judgments. 
In conclusion, the four experiments presented here pro- 
vide converging evidence for a  theory of estimation pro- 
cesses in which people either combine information from an 
item  level  and  a  category  level  or  (in  the  absence  of 
item-level knowledge) use category knowledge to generate 
their  estimates.  In  the  case  of  geography,  even  when 
item-level knowledge is sparse, people can go a long way by 
using regional prototypes. The data therefore also provide 218  FRIEDMAN AND BROWN 
more direct evidence that the representation of geographical 
knowledge contains  categorical information, in addition to 
all  sorts  of other  information  about  a  given  geographical 
region  (its  climate,  the  languages  spoken,  the  number  of 
time zones, the time it takes to fly there, etc.). The data also 
provide direct evidence that regional knowledge is respon- 
sible  for various  geographical  illusions  and  biases.  When 
people are given new item information, under some circum- 
stances it propagates by inheritance to only other items in the 
region.  In other circumstances,  however, where  adjacency 
relations  dictate,  new  information  about  the  location  of a 
single city can shift an entire continent. These psychological 
plate  tectonics  provide  insights  into  the  nature  of  the 
representation of geographical knowledge and how it is used 
to make judgments. 
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